C.B. MACPHERSON
1911 — 1987

Daniel Drache / Arthur Kroker

C.B. Macpherson was a political theorist who was known internationally as one of the twentieth-century’s foremost socialist critics of liberalism: a thinker who undertook a genealogy of the contradictions of liberal-democracy at the level of property and the state; and who, moreover, developed the fundamental concept of “possessive individualism” into a more general political theory: of the failing liberal personality (The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism); of the crisis of “democratic” capitalism (The Real World of Democracy); of the interpellation of law and ideology in the welfare state (Property); of the ethical bankruptcy of the liberal account of contractual justice (Economic Justice); of the class-ridden character of authoritarian populism (Democracy in Alberta); of the irreconcilability of property and democracy (Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval); and, finally, of liberalism and conservatism as reverse mirror-images under the same ideological sign (Burke and The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy). Better than anyone else of his generation, Macpherson developed a critical, comprehensive and persuasive account of the limits and possibilities of liberalism as the dominant ideological formation of advanced capitalist societies.

Macpherson’s theoretical account of the fate of liberal democracy was based principally on his pivotal study Democracy in Alberta, a work which forced him to deepen and extend his analysis of democracy and the party system in a mature capitalist economy. Specifically Canadian in its setting (the emergence of authoritarian populism in response to the crisis-prone character of the Canadian state in the 1930s), and yet global in its political implications, Democracy in Alberta was the key stepping-stone between Macpherson’s Canadian origins and his later path-breaking studies of the origins and development of liberalism — whether as a theory of the state
(an unlikely fusion of economic liberalism and political egalitarianism), an ideological proclamation concerning the absolute sovereignty of private property rights, a psychology ("possessive individualism"), a discursive understanding of the market-place as a key model of social and political theory ("accumulative" and "maximizing" behaviours), or as a market-steered theory of law.

In *Democracy in Alberta* — a work which was originally published in 1953 at the height of the Cold War — Macpherson undertook a Marxist analysis of the party system. The stunning victories of the Social Credit movement in Alberta of the 1930s became the laboratory *par excellence* for developing and testing his theory of liberal democracy and the role played by the party system in simultaneously advancing and suppressing class interests. In this crucial text, Macpherson translated a specific, local and regional analysis of the democratic party system into a classic account of the contradictions of the petit-bourgeoisie in liberal societies. As a new and persistent species of democratic government, Social Credit raised the most fundamental questions about the character of democratic governments under conditions of sharp class divisions and almost panic-like economic crisis. What seized Macpherson's attention was the dual role played by the party system in democratic theory in articulating, yet containing, divergent class claims on the body politic. For Macpherson, the political contradictions of Social Credit populism in Alberta were ultimately the key ideological contradictions of the *system* of Western liberal democracy writ small. Indeed, it might be said that *Democracy in Alberta* presented Macpherson with a political and theoretical problem — the failure of experiments in radical democracy and the turn to authoritarian populism at a decisive moment in the crisis of capitalist society — which took him the rest of his life to begin to solve.

It was not coincidental that the rise to power of the Social Credit movement in Western Canada in the thirties should have forced Macpherson not only to explore problems confronting liberal democracy but, more particularly, to reflect on the relation of the party system to certain particularities of Canadian society where only the powerful have political influence. In a country where the claims of individualism were traditionally weak and the reality of class glaringly strong, the Canadian party system became the logical institution for revolutionizing the study of Canadian political economy.

Under Innis and Creighton, Canadian political economy was cast in a narrow mould of geographic determinism where environmentalism was the bedrock of Canadian social science. Macpherson changed this with his formative study of Canada as an integral part of the advanced capitalist world. As a necessary corrective to Innis, Macpherson's critical exploration of the significance of the Social Credit movement in Alberta confirmed
that democracy came as an ideological "top dressing" to market society — even in Canada, a society marginal to Western political development. Whether in new or old societies marked by the ascendency of liberal ideology, individualism would be betrayed by the older problem of class. Moreover, the Canadian situation underlined another reality that would loom large in Macpherson's later work; namely, the importance of the market mechanism as the central structure of liberal democratic society. Democratic institutions had to accommodate themselves to the operation of a competitive, individualist market society which did not erase class lines and was not expected to. In fact, Canada could be thought of as a 'pure' model where pluralistic theory and the class concept of democracy co-habited in rather unstable and unpredictable ways. On one hand, the Social Credit experience led Macpherson to invent a new category to describe a political structure such as a political party which is a really a non-party: political governments chosen for "efficiency in administration of policies on which there is no deep and lasting division among the electorate." On the other hand, he rejected any suggestion that non-party systems should be confused with a one-party system. At a deeper level, the distinct category of a quasi-party system was needed as a middle way between an alternate-party system — non-existent in the case of Alberta — and a one-party 'socialist' state for which there is no requisite working class basis.

In looking at different dimensions, old and new, of democratic theory in Alberta, the role of the party system tout court could not be reduced (as orthodox political scientists wished) to neutralize politics to "... a sort of market which measures and equates political supply and demand." For Macpherson, pluralist political theory, under the pretext of being a value-free discipline, took the critical and humanistic content out of political economy. The real issue — and what pluralism ignored — was that the party system had a primary task; namely, to diffuse and contain class opposition. His study of the independent commodity producers of Alberta led to the conclusion that moderating class conflict is not only the raison d'etre of the party system but, in advanced capitalist countries under pressure to moderate their economic structure, will likely become more strategically important than its ability to perform brokerage functions between competing interest groups. The unfolding of Canadian political history in the 1980s has witnessed the fundamental accuracy of Macpherson's analysis. Macpherson's theoretical lucidity also led him to speculate that the future of Canadian federalism also lay precisely in this direction. Social Credit was an early warning system of coming transformations in the Canadian party system.

Although a classic in Canadian political economy, *Democracy in Alberta*
remains a curiously unfinished exploration of liberal democracy, pluralism and market society— the very themes that were to dominate Macpherson's interest for the next quarter-century. For Macpherson, *Democracy in Alberta* demonstrated simultaneously the full historical limits of orthodox class analysis as well the incipient contradictions of democracy and property. It brought him to the realization that what was required was a theory of the market economy which demonstrated the full tensions between democracy and the acquisitive impulses of maximizing market behaviours. Macpherson's project became then that of understanding liberal democracy as a *historical phenomenon*: this entailed a *political* analysis of the economic logic underlying liberal market societies; and an *economic* diagnosis of the contradictions of liberalism and democracy. Ultimately, Macpherson adopted a genealogical strategy: one which explored the origins of liberal democracy, property and the evolution of the market in the formation of Western capitalist culture.

Revisiting classical democratic theory in the Western tradition— at first, from Hobbes, Locke, Mill to the Levellers and later from Max Weber to Karl Polanyi — Macpherson focussed, almost exclusively, on the historical development of the market as a gigantic mechanism of social order and social dislocation. Why? More than is customary in orthodox political economy and with the eloquence of unerring intellectual precision, Macpherson insisted that *only* the market was capable of transforming the most fundamental of economic arrangements as well as the whole of civil society. Nothing would be excluded. Everything would be subjected to this vast, speeded-up and fully extended universalization of the commodity-form. Religion, subjectivity, marriage, the ideological concept of “careers,” democratic theory: all would be interpellated by the transformative idea of individual market freedom and the freedom of market choice.

In industrialized countries from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, this creative tension between democracy (as a *political* theory of egalitarianism) and liberalism (as utilitarian *economic* ideology) had revolutionized society. The justificatory assumption was simply that the market would maximize the utilities of the whole society, although this might necessarily involve inequalities in freedom of choice. Contrary to the traditional claims of democratic theory, the deeper reality of market society was maximum accumulation for the few and maximum dependency for the many. For Macpherson, this fundamental inequality in the “transfers of power” at the centre of liberal society was the key problematic for liberal democratic theory: the requirement “to reconcile the claims of the free market with the claims of the whole mass of individuals for some kind of equality.”3 Unlike most Marxist scholarship which is reductionist on the question of the relationship of democratic politics to the commodity-form, Macpherson’s theorisation of this relationship was both nuanced and original. He explored, in exhaustive detail, how democratic ideology was
simultaneously functional and dysfunctional for the smooth operation of capitalist market societies. Long before Claus Offe’s theoretical analysis of the state in administered capitalism, Macpherson insisted that market economies come to rely on and yet simultaneously refuse the legitimating logic of democratic ideologies. The ‘market right’ requires democratic ideology both to sweep aside the detritus of feudalism and to install the historical class compromise necessary for its very operation. Equally however, the market must work to suppress the revolutionary possibilities inherent in liberalism before the unfolding logic of democracy threatens the sovereignty of private property. Macpherson’s brilliant decoding of the ambivalent politics represented by the very term ‘liberal democracy’ stands at the apex of his thought.

As a twentieth century theorist fully sensitive to the transformation of capitalism from its competitive to its regulatory phase, and as one who was equally alert to the dangers of totalitarian liberalism, Macpherson developed a new theory of political economy: one which would recuperate the best possibilities of democratic theory into a critical politics of individualism; and which would function simultaneously to expose the lie in liberal democracy — its ‘suffocation’ of developmental democracy by market-maximizing forces. Macpherson’s thought, then, was a remarkable synthesis: a political economist, not only of historical capitalism, but also of the newest phase of regulatory capitalism. And all this with the consciousness of a classical democrat.

Because Macpherson was a working democrat, his thought confronted with telling honesty actual historical transformations in the nature of the working class. Refusing the theoretical abstraction of the ‘automatic’ proletariat, he brought to bear a powerful and rich optic on the effects of science and technology on labour. Theorizing that the welfare state would ultimately produce “... a less oppressed and more educated and versatile working class,” Macpherson confronted directly key orthodoxies in Marxian labour theories. His aim was to revitalize Marxist labour theory by the method of high realism; that is, addressing critically the dramatically new political and economic circumstances confronting the post-industrial working class.

Too much a socialist on the question of the class bias of Western political democracy ever to be content with “neutralist political theory,” Macpherson’s thought could never be reconciled with the ‘pluralistic’ and epistemologically neutered claims of liberal ideology. And, too much a liberal on the issue of recuperating the dynamic tension between individual freedom and state-sponsored theories of democracy — whether of the left or the right — Macpherson could never accept the subordination of democratic individualism to theorisations privileging the ideology of the commodity-form. His thought occupied a critical middleground between
reductionist socialism and opaque liberalism and, more than is customary in critical political theory, worked at the very edge of ambiguity, heterodoxy, and realism. While orthodox socialism might privilege class, there was never anything 'elusive' about 'C.B.'s Marxism. The politics of transformation was at the forefront of all of his theoretical analysis. Indeed, in the last decade of his life — principally in Economic Justice and Democratic Theory — Macpherson focused squarely on the dilemmas of democratic individualism in the contemporary welfare state. Resituating the issue of the class-specificity of the welfare state in the broader framework of a fully relational theory of power, Macpherson's analysis gave a high-profile to the politics of empowerment and individual rights: the developmental capacities of the free individual working within, but against, the constraints of late capitalist society. Consequently, Macpherson's political legacy was to restore to socialism a humanistic vision of democracy and to liberalism an austere analysis of class-mediated societies. His theoretical analysis of the dilemmas of the welfare state ran parallel to political diagnoses of major social movements in advanced industrial societies: the Greens, socialist feminism, anti-war movements and liberation theology. This was, once again, critical political theory in the service of a transformative vision of society.

Perhaps, though, C.B. Macpherson might best be remembered, and honoured, by stating simply that his emblematic concept — possessive individualism — represents, at once, his finest political contribution to understanding the structure of contemporary capitalist domination and his unfinished theoretical legacy. In the concept of possessive individualism, Macpherson captured the full sweep of his times: the schizoid quality of the petit-bourgeoisie (whose politics always short-circuit their economic interests); the reduction of the self to property in capitalist society; the abolition of democratic use-value by the universalizing commodity-form; the recapitulation of the competitive market-place into the logic of regulatory capitalism; and, finally, the suppression of the self-developmental capacities of democratic individualism at the behest of the acquisitive impulses of the market-place. As a sweeping summational concept, possessive individualism designates, in one stroke, the politics (liberal-democratic), the dominant psychological principle (the "acquisitive individual"), the economics ("maximizing"), the technological laws of operation (market-steered), the key cultural mode (the aestheticization of power), and the prevalent labour theory (the technification of labour under conditions of industrial, and later service, economies) of the whole of advanced capitalist societies existing in the shadow of the Year 2000.

Macpherson's political analysis ultimately did not take full advantage of the theoretical complexity of the concept of possessive individualism. This indicates that an integral part of Macpherson's unfinished legacy is to provide the key to a new and decisive link between the approach of political
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economy which he so favoured and other theoretical strategies — semiotics, cultural studies, and psychoanalysis — which, as a thinker deeply marked by the Canadian realities of class, property and the market, he found so intellectually alien. For better or for worse, 'possessive individualism' directly centres today on issues concerning the ideological production of subjectivity in capitalist discourse. That Macpherson's interpretation of political economy opens up important political questions which, however, cannot be solved within the limits of his thought, does him no dishonour. Like other critical thinkers before him, from Marx and Weber to Adorno and Polanyi, Macpherson has revisited on our behalf the Medusa of history; and has come away, once again, only with more unanswered — and perhaps unanswerable — questions.

Notes


2. Ibid., p. 240.


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Was John Locke a "bourgeois" theorist? Was he a legitimizer of the activities of the nascent English bourgeoisie? These questions have been hotly disputed in the history of political theory. The view that Locke was a bourgeois theorist goes back to Marx, who wrote that Locke's social theory "was the classical expression of bourgeois society's ideas of right as against feudal society, and moreover his philosophy served as the basis of the whole of subsequent English political economy."1 In contemporary political theory, this view has been argued most forcefully and convincingly by C.B. Macpherson, in his renowned *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (1961). Macpherson, in an intricate analysis which will be discussed below, concluded that Locke's *Second Treatise* "provides a moral foundation for bourgeois appropriation" and "a moral basis for a class state."2 This view has recently been challenged in a brilliant book by James Tully, *A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his Adversaries* (1980).3 Tully, much influenced by the methodological writings of Quentin Skinner and John Dunn,4 and by Dunn's important *The Political Thought of John Locke* (1969),5 argues that Locke can only be understood as a natural law theorist rooted in a Thomist conception of politics, property, and man's relation to God. Contrary to the Macpherson thesis, Tully argues that Locke's intention in writing the *Second Treatise* was to refute the idea of unlimited accumulation and argue for limits based upon natural law and man's equality with man vis-à-vis God.

In this paper I will summarize and evaluate the arguments of Macpherson and Tully, paying particular attention to methodological issues. I believe that each of the two theorists is partially correct. Tully presents a persuasive criticism of Macpherson based upon a sophisticated analysis of seventeenth century political theory. He is convincing that Locke's project was not the justification of capitalism. However, while I
believe that much of Macpherson's reasoning is persuasively repudiated, it is nonetheless the case that his sense of Locke as a bourgeois theorist will be sustained, although with important modifications. Locke's theory, his intentions aside, does provide a justification for important features of capitalism.

I. The Macpherson-Tully Controversy

Macpherson develops the thesis that seventeenth century English political thought, running from Hobbes, through the Levellers, and James Harrington, to Locke, was characterized by the spirit of "possessive individualism." He does this by examining seeming "contradictions" in various political theories, and by exploring certain background "social assumptions" which might explain/resolve these contradictions. With Locke, the major problem is how he could have developed a political theory which both justified private property and based political legitimacy upon universal contractual obligation. If Locke's theory is intended to justify the prerogatives of private property holders, then how could it presume to ground legitimacy upon the consent of all, when the greater part of Locke's society (as Macpherson depicts it) consisted of persons who did not own sufficient property to qualify them to express their consent? And if it was intended to articulate some concept of the general good as embodied in the political majority, then how could its prime function be the preservation of private property?

In this context, Macpherson identifies a "radical contradiction" in Locke: if man in the state of nature is, as Locke says, peaceful and rational, then why is civil society necessary? If the state of nature is not, as in Hobbes, a state of war, then why are its "inconveniences" so great that they would cause men to quit that state and form a political society? Macpherson's answer is that Locke entertain two antithetical views of man and reason. The first is the image of the paragon of bourgeois virtue, the peaceful, rational man, inter-acting with his fellows on the basis of Christian natural-law equality and atomistic individualism. This image corresponds with the "universal" individual who contracts into civil society. The second is a class-differentiated concept of man and rationality — only those who own private property in the means of production are rational, as rationality is associated with the industriousness which only property owners can embody. On this view, Locke views workers as basically irrational and morally inferior to the industrious, accumulating private property owners. Macpherson's central point is that underlying Locke's theorization is a concept of class differentiation. This explains why the state of nature is sometimes described as a peaceful condition and sometimes as a state of war — Locke's two views of man underly the two different descriptions. As regards property owners,
peaceful rationality obtains. But the irrational workers, both through their covetousness and lack of industry, and the threat they pose to the rational accumulation of wealth, warrant the characterization of the state of nature as a state of war. It is thus in order to quell this class antagonism and secure their private property in the means of production, that the people consent to form civil society.\textsuperscript{9}

However, this situation raises the further question of who constitutes the "people" who opt into civil society? Macpherson answers that it is the property owners. While Locke seems to base government upon universal consent, this is implicitly qualified by Locke's background assumption regarding the irrationality of the working class. This because Locke is clear that civil society is based upon voluntary, rational consent. It is on this basis that he distinguishes between paternal and political power in both the First and Second Treatise. Macpherson argues that this background assumption regarding the working class illuminates Locke's distinction between tacit and express consent to political authority.\textsuperscript{10} As Locke writes, while the former "makes not a man a member of that society...nothing can make any man so, but his actually entering into it by positive Engagement, and express Promise and Compact."\textsuperscript{11} Macpherson argues that only property owners expressly consent, becoming full members of the commonwealth, while workers, lacking both property and rationality, are merely subjects of the state, bound to obey its commands. This is seen to be implicit in Locke's assumptions, not explicit in his exposition. Thus, Locke provides a legitimation of a class state, based upon the protection of private property and the political exclusion of the working class. The apparent universality of Locke's political theory is interpreted by Macpherson as masking its particularity as an ideology of the bourgeoisie.

The foundation of Macpherson's interpretation is his analysis of Chapter V of the Second Treatise, entitled "Of Property." It is here where Macpherson adduces Locke to have implicitly assumed the existence of capitalist relations of production based upon wage labor. Locke begins this crucial chapter by asserting that the earth is given in common to all men by God. The problem Locke sets out to resolve is "how men might come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to Mankind in common, and that without any express Compact of all the commoners."\textsuperscript{12} Locke continues that "every man has a property in his own Person...the Labor of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his." It is through the "mixing" of one's labor with "what nature hath provided," that one individuates one's own from the common, and "makes it his property."\textsuperscript{13} Labor, which is the property of the laborer, is the source of material property. However, as Locke emphasizes, "The same law of Nature, that does by this means give us Property, does also bound that Property too."\textsuperscript{14} There are thus important limits placed upon the
accumulation of possessions: (1) a spoilage limitation; (2) a provision that “enough, and as good” be left for others, and (3) the stipulation that one is only justified in appropriating what one has produced through his own labor.

This situation thus far described is one where individual appropriation of the common is bounded, and there is enough for all. With the introduction of money by tacit consent (de facto usage) in the state of nature, all of this is changed. Larger possessions are thus justified. This is because money is a non-perishable commodity which when exchanged for a product, can be stored without spoilage. With the introduction of money men both have the incentive to produce more than they can use, and are justified in doing so — the spoilage limitation is transcended. The second provision, that enough and as good be left for others, is also transcended. Macpherson adduces this from Locke’s statement that “he who appropriates land to himself by his labor, does not lessen but increase the common stock of mankind.” Macpherson argues, on the basis of this text, that Locke possesses a concept of productivity. So long as productivity is increased, the second provision is transcended because more is produced for the use of everyone.

This still leaves the labor limitation. Macpherson argues here that Locke implicitly assumes the existence of wage labor throughout his discussion, so that this limitation cannot be understood literally. The crucial text is the one where Locke discusses individual appropriation, through labor, of the common. He writes:

Thus the Grass my Horse has bit; the Turfs my Servant has cut; and the Ore I have digg’d in any place where I have a right to them in common with others, become my Property, without the assignation or consent of anybody. the labour that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed by Property in them. (emphasis added).

Macpherson adduces from this and other texts (discussed below) that Locke assumed the existence of wage labor, otherwise he could not have considered the labor of a servant as belonging to his master. Macpherson argues that Locke’s characterization of labor as a possession of individuals implies the alienability of labor, and that this is built into Locke’s labor theory of property.

Thus, mixing one’s labor is bound neither by the spoilage limitation, the provision of enough and as good for others, nor the individual labor of the proprietor. As Locke writes:
it is plain that men have agreed to disproportionate and unequal Possession of the Earth, they having by a tacit and voluntary consent found out a way, how a man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use the product of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus, Gold and Silver, which may be hoarded up without injury to any one, these metals not spoiling or decaying in the hands of the possessor. This partage of things, in an inequality of private possessions, men have made practicable out of the bounds of Societie and without compact, only by putting a value on gold and silver and tacitly agreeing in the use of Money.  

Macpherson argues on this basis that Locke justifies unlimited accumulation of private possessions in the state of nature. Moreover, as this state presupposes wage labor, man is not only an egoistic, possessive individualist, but an accumulator of capital. Locke’s entire political theory, on this view, is predicated upon the maintenance of capitalist relations of production. It is in this light that Macpherson argues that the defense of private property is Locke’s primary concern. He thus claims that while there is an important difference between Locke’s support of the restored Stuart monarchy in 1660, and his constitutionalism in 1680, “‘The difference in the two positions is not as great as it might seem, since . . . he was consistent throughout in wanting a civil authority which could secure the basic institutions of class society.’”

Tully’s thesis is that Locke’s political theory must be located in terms of the prevailing linguistic conventions and political context. For Tully, Locke’s linguistic context is natural law theory and the language of modern subjective rights, and his political context is the English Exclusion Crisis of 1681-82. More specifically, Locke’s Two Treatises of Government must be seen as an extensive criticism of Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha and Filmer’s attempt to justify royal absolutism and arbitrary monarchical power. In executing this criticism, and in making the argument for limited government, Locke draws upon the political language of natural law in order to formulate an alternative conception of the relation between property and government.  

According to Tully, the central motif running throughout Locke’s philosophy is the “workmanship model.” Tully, identifying this motif in Locke’s earlier writings, and also in his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, argues that the workmanship model plays a central ontological and epistemological role. Ontologically, it establishes a dependent relationship between that which is created and the active being which created it. Epistemologically, it establishes a privileged access to knowledge by the creator, of that which he created. As Tully quotes Locke in the Essay, this model is “the Foundation of our Duty and Rules of Action from which the measures of right and wrong be made out.”
implications of this model for political theory are as follows. Man, as the author of his own actions, has privileged access to knowledge of that which he does and creates. That which he creates also stands in a relation of dependence upon him. However, man also stands in a relation of dependence to God, who created the earth and man. Man does not have privileged access to knowledge of his essence as a creation of God — only God possesses this. He also does not have certain knowledge of God, nor of the essence of the relation between man and God. However, from the law of sufficient reason, Locke is able to argue that God exists, that God created man, and that man therefore stands in a relation of dependence with God, since makership bestows dominion upon the maker. Locke thus writes in the *Essay*:

> The original and foundation of all Law is dependency. A dependent intelligent being is under the power and direction and dominion of him on whom he depends and must be for the ends appointed him by that superior being. If man were independent he could have no law but his own will no end but himself.  

This is very important in refuting those commentators on Locke who downplay the centrality of natural law to his political theory. Locke describes law as "that which prescribes to everything the form and manner and measure of working." Tully argues that this is a *positive* concept of law, entailing both a concept of *rights* and a corresponding concept of *duties*. The relation of man to God, and the natural law which is based upon this relation, thus has important consequences for Locke's notions of property and legitimate government.

According to Tully, Locke's analysis of property must be understood in counterposition to those of Grotius' *The Laws of War and Peace* (1625) and Pufendorf's *The Law of Nature and Nations* (1672). Both of these authors had conceived property as an exclusive, private right to possession. As Pufendorf writes: "Property or Dominion, is a right, by which the very substance, as it were, of a Thing, so belongs to one Person, that it doth not in whole belong, after the same manner, to any other." In other words, property is actual, exclusive, private possession. For both Grotius and Pufendorf, although the earth was originally given by God to man in common in the state of nature, private property had come to legitimately established through the right of *first occupancy*. He who first controls a given thing or piece of territory, establishes rightful dominion, or property in it. As Tully argues, this is a radically individualist doctrine, and a radically conventionalist account of property. In the hands of Grotius and Pufendorf, it is used to justify slavery, absolute monarchical authority, and unlimited private accumulation of wealth. Locke's analysis of property in the *Two
Treatises is a repudiation of this doctrine. But Locke's confrontation of the doctrine of exclusive property right is mediated by his concern with refuting the political arguments of Robert Filmer, a proponent of the idea of divine right of kings, and a supporter of the monarchy in the Exclusion Crisis.

As I have sketched, Grotius and Pufendorf articulated radically subjectivist theories of right, based upon first occupancy of the common. Filmer opposed the conventionalism of such an approach, and devoted considerable energy to criticizing it. As he writes:

Grotius saith, that by law of nature all things were at first common, and yet reacheth, that after property was brought in, it was against the law of nature to use community. He doth thereby not only make the law of nature changeable, which he saith God cannot do, but he also makes the law of nature contrary to itself. 27

Filmer thus rejects modern subjective rights theory. In its place he articulates the Adamite doctrine that God gave "natural and private dominion" of the earth to Adam, and that this is the basis of the absolute, divine right of kings. Filmer makes this "traductionist" argument in Patriarcha by assimilating patriarchal and political authority, and thus by arguing both that royal power is absolute like that of patriarchal power, and that royal power is hereditary, its lineage being God's grant to Adam.

Locke's First Treatise is a brilliant critique of the scriptural and logical errors in Filmer's argument. Here Locke, following Aristotle, differentiates between familial and political relations. Moreover, he does this by articulating the doctrine of "creationism." This is that doctrine that God is the knowing maker of man, and that parents are merely intervening causal factors. On this view, rooted in Locke's workmanship model, any rights of man must be based upon his creation by God and the relation which derives from this. Thus, as God creates everyone, there is no basis for Filmer's concept of absolute patriarchal authority — all fathers are equally dependent upon God, and God's natural laws. Also, this dissolves the Adamite notion of absolute political authority. This is because, as all men are created equal by God, there is no natural basis for political authority. Because all men are created equal, political authority must be based upon voluntary consent.

Locke develops his own concept of property in direct contrast to that of Filmer. For Filmer, the monarch possessed exclusive property in his territory and his subjects, analogous to the property a father has in his children. For Locke, as Tully points out, the word "property" is equivocal — it refers both to a right and to the material referent of a right, that which the right is claimed against. 28 Tully undertakes an intricate discussion of the First Treatise, demonstrating that for Locke property is (1) a right possessed
by all; (2) a right to preservation and subsistence; and that (3) this translates into a use right in the earth, which is given to mankind in common; (4) this property, or right, has a specified end, delimited by natural law, and is antithetical to Filmer’s concept of property as unbounded will, and (5) it is a right to one’s due, not to one’s own. In other words, it is an inclusive right, which is possessed by all men by virtue of their being equal creations of God. It is a right both defined by natural law and delimited by it.29

The crucial problem of Chapter V of the Second Treatise is the problem of the individuation of the common, i.e., how individuals can use and appropriate that which God has given to mankind in common. We will recall that this is Grotius’ problem, and that Filmer’s “traductionist” argument is based upon the presumed incoherence of natural law justifying both common and private appropriation. However, what is crucial is that Locke, in taking up this problem, is refuting not only Filmer but Grotius as well. This is because, as Tully so convincingly argues, Locke actually employs a Thomist conception of common property translated into the language of subjective rights. This conception places severe limits upon subjectivity. As Locke writes, the foundation of all law is the dependence of man upon God. This is at variance with the arbitrary, voluntarist conception of subjectivity entertained by both Grotius and Filmer, and their corresponding concept of property as an exclusive right of private ownership. According to Tully, Locke rejects the concept of property as exclusive individual possession, and articulates this in his distinction between a right to and a right in.30 This distinction, which Tully traces back to the Spanish Counter-Reformation theorist Suarez, in The Laws and God the Lawgiver (1612), is based upon a concept of right as enabling and constraining. Individual rights (in their person and in the use of common property in the earth) both enable men to actualize their duties to God and their potentialities as human agents, and constrain them from doing so arbitrarily. More specifically, Locke rejects unconditional private property. This is because God, as creator of man and the earth, has true ownership and dominion in them. Men have property in their actions insofar as these do not contravene natural law. And men have property in the earth and material things, to use, as long as this use is consonant with natural law and man’s obligations to God. Tully argues that Locke’s concept of material private property is analogous to the medieval concept of usufruct — men have conditional use rights over that which is the property of God. It is in this light that Locke’s concept of private property as the product of a man’s mixing of his labor with natural materials is relevant. This does not establish unconditional property in it — it is simply the means by which the common is individuated. A man’s material property is determined by his makership. But in the Lockean cosmos, it is not man, but God, who occupies center stage.
Individual appropriation is thus circumscribed by the law of nature. This law, which is based upon (1) the preservation of mankind; (2) the rights of all men to their due; and (3) the performance of duties and obligations toward God, places crucial limits upon appropriation.31

Tully further argues that Locke had an antipathy toward commerce which led him to interpret the introduction of money as leading to corruption. As Locke writes in *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*:

> Covetousness, and the desire of having in our Possession, and under Dominion, more than we have need of, being the root of all Evil, should be early and carefully weeded out, and the contrary quality of a readiness to impart to others, implanted.32

This, according to Tully, is the basis of the need to quit the state of nature and form a civil society. Moreover, as Tully points out, for Locke, the individual, in entering into civil society, not only alienates his executive power over his own life, but also alienates his material possessions. As Locke writes in the *Second Treatise*: “every Man, when he, at first, incorporates himself into any Commonwealth, he, by uniting himself thereunto, annexed also, and submits to the Community those Possessions, which he has, or shall acquire, that do not already belong to any other Government.”33 Once civil society is formed, then, property in material possessions is conventionally determined by civil law. According to Tully, the final task of Chapter V of the *Second Treatise* is to explain the dysfunctional behavior of natural individuality based upon mixing of labor, once money is introduced. Thus, contra Macpherson, the purpose of civil society is not to ratify a prior distribution of private property in the state of nature. It is to establish a *just* distribution according to the natural law and the three inclusive claim rights. Civil law is thus in accordance with natural law, but it is not in accordance with the distribution of property consequent upon the introduction of money. According to Tully: “once the rule that every man should have as much as he can make use of is rescinded, no appropriation is justified.”34 The function of government is thus not the preservation of exclusive private property, but the establishment of a *just* distribution of property based upon the common good and natural law. Locke is therefore not a legitimizer of unlimited accumulation, hence not of bourgeois relations of production; he is a theorist of natural law and limited use rights. As Tully puts it: “the implication of Macpherson’s explanation is that emergent capitalism found the clearest reflection of its central concept, and so its ideology, in Sir Robert Filmer’s *Patriarcha*.35

Tully’s analysis of Locke’s intentions is quite illuminating, and on the whole convincing. Macpherson, in arguing that Locke “provides a moral foundation for bourgeois appropriation,” compares Locke to Hobbes,
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the "possessive individualist" theorist who lacked such a moral component. For Macpherson, then, the history of "possessive individualism" is a history of its progressive articulation as a moral doctrine justifying the class rule of the bourgeoisie. Tully, writing from the point of view of modern linguistic philosophy and philosophy of action, is much more concerned with the subjective intentions of Locke. What does it mean to say that Locke was a bourgeois theorist? Does it mean that this is what he intended, that this is what he meant to say? For Tully, the interpretation of a text is the understanding of the meaningful communication of an intentional human agent. This requires an understanding of the linguistic and illocutionary contexts of the communication.36 We cannot appreciate which "social assumptions" influenced Locke without first understanding what it was that Locke was saying. In order to do this, we must understand the language which he employed, its conventional usages, etc. Furthermore, in order to understand what he was meaning to say, we must grasp the context in which he was communicating, the active intervention in the social world which the speech act was intending to accomplish.

Macpherson is oblivious to these important methodological canons. He discusses Locke in the context of Hobbes even though Hobbes is in no way pivotal for Locke. As Dunn writes, the problem for Hobbes was political order; the problem for Locke was legitimate government and the limitation of arbitrary authority.37 This Filmer is Locke's target, and the Exclusion Crisis his political context. Locke was not responding to Hobbes' incomplete articulation of "possessive individualism," as Macpherson implies, but to the problem of absolute monarchy in the context of the Whig opposition to Charles II. In refuting Filmer's Adamite doctrine of divine right of Kings, Locke is forced to articulate an alternative theory of property. In doing so, he employs the language of modern subjective rights, but underlying this language is a strong commitment to a Thomistic concept of natural law. In this sense he must be seen as a critic of Grotius and Pufendorf as well. If we read Locke contextually, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that he clearly situated himself in a contemporary debate on the side of definite limits to the accumulation of material property. As Tully makes clear, in taking this position Locke was not alone; others, such as John Selden, in Of the Dominion or Ownership of the Seas (1636), and Richard Cumberland, in A Treatise on the Laws of Nature (1672), similarly articulated opposition to the idea of exclusive, unlimited appropriation.38

In this context, Macpherson's central thesis, that Locke justifies a class state, must be questioned. First of all, as Dunn and Tully have argued, there is no basis for Macpherson's claim that Locke intends to exclude the working class from political life. Dunn makes a persuasive argument that consent is the occasion of political legitimacy, but it is not the ground of it —
natural law is the ground of legitimacy, the reason for the formation of political society. Consent itself thus is subordinated in Locke's theory to man's natural law equality. Locke is clear that in the state of nature men are perfectly free to act, within the bounds of the law of nature, and that therefore a necessary condition of the legitimacy of political society is voluntary consent. Macpherson's claim that workers are tacitly obligated to obey the state without expressly consenting is at variance with Locke's explicit formulations. It rests on Macpheson's further claim that Locke saw workers as irrational. But Macpherson's textual evidence here is quite sparse, and is limited to Locke's *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, which Dunn argues must be understood in terms of Locke's belief in original sin and his moral pessimism deriving from his religious praxis.

Macpherson's claim is further weakened by Dunn's argument that in the seventeenth century there were a number of occasions, most notably oaths of allegiance, upon which men were required to perform actions which could reasonably be described as giving positive oaths. These requirements were incumbent upon all natural-born Englishmen. There is thus no reason to interpret Locke's distinction between express and tacit consent as the basis of his exclusion of the working class from politics. Once we recognize that Locke's intentions were not the creation of a class state but limited government, and further that Locke opposed unlimited accumulation, then there is further reason to doubt Macpherson's claim that Locke's political theory is based upon the maintenance of the political power of a minority of private property owners and the political exclusion of the majority.

II. Tully Overturned: Locke as a Bourgeois Theorist

Tully has persuasively argued that Locke intended not to justify unlimited accumulation and the political exclusion of workers, but to criticize unlimited accumulation and defend the idea of human natural equality. However, to say that Locke didn't intend to justify capitalism is not to say that he didn't do so. From a realist perspective, it is quite possible that one can be said to do things other than what one intends to do. To label a theorist an ideologist, on this view, is to say that the structural consequence of that theorist's work is to legitimate a specific kind of society. In Marxian terms, it is to contend that a theorist serves to mystify, whether intentionally or unintentionally, actual social relations.

It is Tully's failure to recognize this, and his narrow focus on authorial intentions, I would suggest, that forces him to misread Locke's text, reasoning (implicitly) as follows: if Locke didn't intend to legitimize capitalism, then he didn't, therefore the text must be read in such a way as to bear this out. Thus, Tully's incredible statement that "the capitalist not
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only never appears in the Two Treatises; there is no place for him to appear."

I will argue below that while Locke might not have intended to justify capitalism, that is indeed what his theory of property does. While the capitalist might not be the focus of Locke's attention, it is nevertheless the case that he is present in Locke's theory. Locke is an ideologist of emergent capitalism, in that, contra Tully, his theory embodies three sorts of social assumptions which are central features of capitalism: (i) individualism, (ii) wage labor, and (iii) extensive private accumulation of wealth. It is only at great pains, and at the cost of serious misreadings, that Tully is able to deny this.

1: Individualism

Tully claims that Locke conceives of man as an essentially social being. He provides textual support, in the form of Locke's claims that man should "follow those rules which conduce to the preserving of society," and that "God has designed Man for a sociable Creature." However, I find Tully's claim unconvincing. He presents some illicit evidence in support of it. For instance, pace Tully, Locke does not assert in Chapter II of the Second Treatise that individuals outside of society are "wild savage beasts." Locke is here talking about criminals who, by their crimes have renounced reason and abjured their natural rights. These individuals, by their actions, place themselves out of society. Furthermore, it is questionable what Locke means by "society" in these instances. Tully's discussion leads us to interpret Locke as talking about sociability. But this does not entail that men be essentially social in the strong sense of this concept for Aristotle or Aquinas. Tully cites Dunn to the effect that Locke, unlike Hobbes, did not presume the problem of an ethical vacuum. True. This is the function of natural law for Locke. But to say that Locke is a natural law theorist is not to say that he articulated a concept of sociality. In fact, Locke's problematic is that of atomistic individualism. True to his Protestantism, it is the individuals' relation to God which occupies the central place in his theory. But while this does place limits upon the actions of individuals, it is still the individual which is the problem for Locke. Contra Tully, Locke's emphasis on contracts and the obligations they create is evidence of Locke's individualism. True, Locke is not a radical subjectivist like Grotius, but for Locke relations between man and man, though mediated by God, are sustained through voluntaristic agreement. There is in Locke no concept of relatively enduring social relations and practices, only voluntaristic interactions between equals. It is on this basis that Locke's analysis of material property is an analysis of individual appropriation — Locke lacks a concept of social production. Labor is thus a property of individuals, and individuation a corollary of this.
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2: Class

Tully claims that Locke can in no way be construed to have possessed a concept of class, particularly a class of wage laborers. He presents a number of arguments to support his claims, none of which sustains them.

(a) the "basic unit" of mankind for Locke is the conjugal family. In criticizing Filmer's arbitrary concept of patriarchal authority, Locke is articulating a "radically restructured communal" concept of the family. To the extent that this is so, "Locke destroys the very foundation of individual rights: the unquestioned assumption that a proprietor is the patriarchal head of a family." Firstly, Tully seems to exaggerate the radicalness of Locke's concept of family. While Locke does oppose arbitrary authority, anyone familiar with the First Treatise will recall that he is also quite explicit about the naturalness of male, patriarchal domination of the household. Family relations may not be absolutist in Locke, but neither are they voluntary. Secondly, it is quite true that Locke sees the family as a natural social unit. The point of arguing that he was an individualist is not to deny that he recognized social relationships, nor that he valued them. It is that for Locke's political theory, for his analysis of appropriation and the formation of political society, it is the male head of the household who alone has status as an effective individual identity. When Locke writes that all men are created equal by God in the state of nature, he is talking about all men. To say that men have natural law obligations to their families is important, but it does not confront the fact that socially and politically it is male individuals who are the only relevant actors, and their relations are voluntaristic. Thirdly, Tully claims that Locke entertains a concept of household analogous to the classical Greek, Aristotelian concept of the oikos, as a communal organization of common property. This may be, and once again Tully's hermeneutic insight is important. However, it is also the case that Locke's household differs radically from that of Aristotle — its head is a proprietor, who must mix his labor as an individual laborer in order to procure subsistence. We may recall that for Aristotle the household is a prerequisite for the good life, providing, through slave labor, for the needs and tastes of the zoon politikon. It is the polis which embodies the good life itself. For Locke, politics is not natural, and the citizen, if we can call him that, labors to procure his own subsistence. This idea is not an ancient one. In fact, the centrality of production to political theory is itself a modern phenomenon. In Locke this is mediated by religious praxis. But for Locke the political individual is also an economic individual.

(b) Tully denies that the "Turfs" passage in Chapter V, which Macpherson relies on, has anything to do with wage labor. Instead, he argues, Locke is referring to the "master-servant" relation, which is radically different. Tully's arguments here are thoroughly unconvincing. He first
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quotes Locke:

a Free-man makes himself a Servant to another, by selling him for a certain time, the Service he undertakes to do, in exchange for Wages he is to receive: And though this commonly puts him into the Family of his Master, and under the ordinary discipline thereof; yet it gives the Master but a Temporary Power over him, and no greater, than what is contained in the contract between 'em. 31

Tully then proceeds to claim that: (1) Locke was opposed to need being the basis of dependence — only voluntary agreement can satisfy the contract of servanthood; (2) since it is a freeman who makes himself a servant, the agreement presupposes that there be a free choice, and that an alternative be available; (3) Locke contrasts servants with slaves. The latter lack freedom and causal efficacy, but the former are makers who create products and embody skills and capacities. The slave, but not the servant, is an instrument of the master's will. Tully thus suggests that there is no room in Locke's theory for capitalist wage labor, which is both predicated upon the absence of alternative means of subsistence for the worker, and is characterized by the subordination of the workers' will to that of the employer. Tully's argument, however, is seriously deficient.

(1) and (2) may be treated together. Tully offers one text in support of both:

Man can no more justly make use of anothers' necessity, to force him to become his vassal, by with-holding that Relief God requires him to afford to the wants of his Brother, than he that has more strength can seize upon a weaker, master him to his obedience, and with a Dagger at his throat offer him Death or Slavery. 52

But the text, in its entirety, suggests that Locke's attitude toward relations established on the basis of need is much more ambiguous than Tully would have it. The sentence directly preceding the one quoted by Tully above reads:

As justice gives every Man a Title to the Product of his honest Industry, and the fair Acquisitions of his Ancestors descended to him; so Charity gives every Man a Title to so much out of another's Plenty, as will keep him from extreme want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise. 53

This sentence implies an important distinction between "justice" and "charity." It is not justice (which Tully suggests is synonymous with right
on p. 66) which requires that need not result in dependence — it is charity. Furthermore, this charity is rightfully forthcoming only if the needy man "has no means to subsist otherwise." It is not clear that all this precludes the existence of wage laborers, who do need an income through the sale of their labor (power) to subsist, but who also possess the ability to work for a living. After all, all contracts are based upon some element of mutual need.

Moreover, section 43, which follows the text quoted above, reads:

... the Authority of the Rich Proprietor, and the Subjection of the Needy Beggar began not from the Possession of the Lord, but the Consent of the poor Man, who preferr'd being his Subject to starving. 54

This certainly suggests that for Locke there had to be no structural alternative for the starving man in order for his "consent" to be considered voluntary. There is a difference implied here between forcing him to become his vassal by withholding relief and accepting the "consent" of the man who wants to work in order to secure subsistence and avoid the vagaries of charity. This attitude is by now too familiar to require gloss; suffice it to say that it is quite compatible with the "double freedom" of the worker which Marx satirizes in Capital. 55 In short, a careful reading of the text suggests quite clearly that Locke's point is not that relations of dependence cannot be established on the basis of need — it is that only consent, not need, can be the moral ground of dependence.

The kind of relation Locke is criticizing does not seem to resemble wage labor at all. The assumption behind wage labor is that the relation between worker and employer is contractual, not traditional or hereditary; that it is not personal, but pursuant upon the performance of impersonal obligations. The section of Locke discussed above seems to apply to a much more personalistic relation. The language of "lordship" and "vassalage" implies that the relation being criticized is the absolute power of the landlord over peasants or serfs. This relation is neither contractual nor impersonal. Furthermore, it is not, like wage labor, limited to a specified service for a specified wage. In short, while Tully is convincing that Locke opposed certain kinds of domination, and that he placed a value on compassion and charity, he is not convincing that anything in Locke is at variance with the possibility of the wage labor contract.

In fact, Tully's description of the servant as a "freeman who contracts with another a service he undertakes to do, for a wage he is to receive," 56 sound remarkably like a description of the wage laborer. Of course, Tully argues that the worker sells a service, not his laboring activity. In other words, Locke lacks the concept of labor-power which underlies wage labor. However, here too Tully is on shaky ground. The text in question says that
the servant sells to his master, "for a certain time, the Service he undertakes to do, in exchange for wages..."\textsuperscript{57} This seems to be a contract based upon time — a contract based less upon the completion of a given task than upon the laboring for a definite time-period. Tully argues that the sale of labor-power is at variance with Locke's contention that a man owns his own actions and that which is created by those actions. It may be that Locke is involved in a self-contradiction here. It may also be that Tully's argument lacks specificity. Tully claims that "Since the labor of a person is defined as actions determined by the will of that person, it is logically impossible for an agent to alienate his labor."\textsuperscript{58} In other words, a man may alienate the product of his labor, or a definite service, but not the labouring activity itself. It is not clear why this is so. To alienate a product, or a definite service, like cutting turf, is to declare beforehand, in an express contract, that the specified product or service will be performed in exchange for a monetary return. To alienate one's labor-power is to specify that x hours of labor will be performed in exchange for y amount of money. In making such a transaction, the worker is not alienating his right to labor, only his capacity to labor, for a specified length of time. To describe one's labor-power as alienated is not to describe it as no longer the causal effect of the agent in question. It is not to deny that the worker has produced a product, nor is it to assert that the worker is an instrument of the will of his employer.\textsuperscript{59} In this sense, Tully's objections to the imputation of wage labor to Locke are off the mark. However, to talk about the alienation of labor-power is to speak not of the sale of a definite service or product, but of an abstract capacity. This does entail that no single, specifiable individual is responsible for the production of any specifiable, concrete product. In other words, it entails a complex division of labor. As we shall see, Locke views a social division of labor and the transcendence of concrete labor as completely consistent with natural law.

3: Accumulation

Macpherson, we will remember, argued that Locke, with the introduction of money into the state of nature, legitimized unlimited accumulation and the transcendence of the three previously stated limitations on it. He further argued that this presupposes wage labor, which he contended Locke did. We have seen that Macpherson is wrong, and that Locke opposed unconditional accumulation. However, this does not mean that he did not allow quite extensive accumulation beyond the stated limitations. I have argued above that Tully provides no evidence for us to reasonably suppose that Locke lacked a concept of wage labor. In fact, he seems to have possessed such a concept. If Tully is wrong, and Locke really does justify extensive accumulation, this will lend further support to the claim that
Locke was a bourgeois theorist. Tully states that "once the rule that every man should have as much as he can make use of is rescinded, no appropriation is justified." He argues from this that the function of civil society is to establish natural justice upon other grounds. However, this seems to be in direct contradiction with Locke's own claim that with the introduction of money "have found out a way, how a man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use the product of...." There is in fact nothing in Chapter V to lead one to believe that Locke saw accumulation beyond use to be unnatural, or unjust. As he says, it is "fair," and is in accordance with natural law. Of course, as Tully argues so brilliantly, this does not mean that Locke justifies unlimited, unconditional accumulation. But it means that the limits for Locke have nothing to do with use. As Tully argues, men have an inclusive claim right to the earth for their subsistence. This claim right is a natural law, and is also the basis of another natural duty, the duty to praise and honor God. However, the extensive accumulation of wealth and appropriation of the earth is not incompatible with this claim right, provided that the consequence of this appropriation is an increase in the amount of subsistence goods available for all. On this point, Macpherson's argument that Locke possessed a concept of productivity must stand — Locke's criteria for the extent of appropriation is utilitarian. This, of course, is subject to the further constraint that men are equal in relation to God, that involuntary subordination, etc., are prohibited. However, as I have argued above, there is nothing in Locke to lead us to believe that the extensive, unequal appropriation described in Chapter V is in contravention of natural law. Tully argues that Locke possesses an essentially Aristotelian concept of money as stimulative of commerce and corruptive of social relations. I will not challenge his contention that money stimulates extensive appropriation, possessiveness, and unforeseen consequences, which lead men to establish a political society. However, Tully's contention that money for Locke led to a transgression of natural law, and that the purpose of political society was to restore man to a more moderate and beneficial state, seems to be unfounded. It is not clear to me, as Tully claims, that Locke discusses money in Chapter V in "language which evinces moral disapproval." Tully produces a text where Locke refers to the "Phantastical imagery value" of money, but the context of this statement is a discussion of the rights of spoils in conquest, and says very little in itself about the nature of money. Locke most definitely does speak of the "temptation" which is a consequence of introduction of money, but this is no evidence of his disapproval of it. He is also quite clear that "covetousness" is a dangerous evil. However, while Tully produces a number of texts making this point, this is not sufficient to demonstrate Locke's antipathy to accumulation. In fact, there is a crucial operative distinction in Locke which
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Tully obscures — that is, the distinction between industriousness and covetousness. As Locke writes of the common: [God] "gave it to the use of the Industrious and Rational . . . not to the Fancy and Contentious."65 Locke's antipathy toward covetousness thus cannot be taken as evidence for his antipathy toward money and the industriousness which it facilitates. In fact, it is industriousness which, as Dunn argues, is a duty to God deriving from Locke's Protestantism; this more than anything else would seem to justify extensive accumulation.66

III. Conclusion

Locke thus justifies extensive accumulation in the state of nature. While this accumulation is accompanied by a growing division of labor and "inconveniences" which require the establishment of a political order, the function of the political order is to reinforce natural law and natural rights. It is true, as Tully argues, that the function of government is not simply to ratify exclusive private property. However, contra Tully, government does institutionalize the extensive inequalities which are compatible with natural law.

Locke's state is a bourgeois state in that it is based upon the juridical, political equality of all men, and their natural private property rights. These rights are individualistic, but they are not radically subjectivist. They are based upon the property of each in his own person, which underlies both the appropriation of nature and the alienation of labor-power. Formally, all men are equal in their possession of property rights construed as claim rights against others. Substantively, however, Locke possesses an embryonic concept of wage labor. This is explicit in some passages. And it is implicit in his justification of accumulation beyond use in the state of nature. This is because to allow this presupposes both that some people employ others to produce these surpluses, and that there be a class of producers which is dispossessed of the means of production, a class which both requires employment in order to secure subsistence, and functions as the necessary consumer of the surplus produced by the commercial proprietor.

Locke wrote in the midst of political struggles which were part of the transition period from feudal to capitalist relations of production.67 He did not intend to justify capitalist appropriation, and he did not articulate a doctrine legitimating unlimited accumulation. However, Locke's theory of property can be interpreted as a critique of feudal notions of property based upon hierarchy and notions of acquisition based upon first occupancy.68 Locke provides a justification of the productive appropriation of nature based upon labor and accumulation. Underlying this is a concept of individual labor which is tied to a concept of individual proprietorship. This essentially petty bourgeois notion is also tied to an embryonic concept
of wage labor as the voluntary disposition of the ability to work on the part of individual laborers.

Locke's doctrine is not that of Nozick. The fact that it is based upon certain inclusive claim rights means that, in contrast to contemporary neo-conservative formulations, it lends itself to welfarist and social democratic practical conclusions. This is important — Locke's theory is not based upon the political exclusion of the working class. It is a theory of the natural equality of abstract individuals, and of the plebiscitarian political inclusion of workers as citizens, subject to the state and its blind, "natural" laws. This political relation at once underlies and ideologically reinforces the wage labor contract and the subordinate position of workers in the capitalist relations of production. It thus expresses what Poulantz has referred to as the characteristic relative autonomy of the political and the economic under capitalism.69

It is also not a theory of the untrammeled free market. Private property in material possessions, being subject to natural law, is limited on both utilitarian and normative-religious grounds for Locke. However, these limits are logically compatible with the extensive accumulation which Locke does permit. Further, it would seem that, if Tully is correct, then the "inconveniences" of the free market were seen by Locke as injustices in the sphere of distribution to be remedied by the state. There is in Locke no sense that capitalism involves relations of *production* based upon structural asymmetries and exploitation, nor any recognition that these relations are fundamentally unjust or undemocratic — for Locke they would seem to embody the freedom to choose. It may be apparent at this point that both Macpherson and Tully agree that capitalism entails unlimited accumulation and extreme possessivism, and only disagree on whether Locke defended these norms. But capitalism is quite compatible with limits, as witness the contemporary welfare state. What is crucial about Locke's limits is that they in no way challenge, and in fact uncritically accept, the existence of emergent capitalist relations of production and appropriation.70

Locke may have been a political radical in the 1680's, but in crucial respects, related to his position vis-à-vis structural transformations taking place in England, he was a bourgeois theorist. The crucial natural law component of his thought, resting upon shaky epistemological foundations, could easily give way to much more empiricist and subjectivist forms of possessivism and utilitarianism. And even given this natural law component, his thought contains assumptions, particularly about labor/appropriation as individual, and labor-power as a property of its possessor alienable in voluntaristic exchange, which are irreducibly bourgeois. Locke's state, based upon formal equalities and substantive structural inequalities, articulates the essential characteristics of the capitalist state.71

This does not mean that we can "explain" Locke's text by seeing it as
the "expression" of social structural transformations. Locke's intentions determined his text, and must be accounted for in any interpretation. However Locke, quite unintentionally, both drew upon a germinating bourgeois ideology of individual appropriation and labor as a commodity, and solidified the normative basis of this ideology. In this important structural sense, Locke must be seen as a bourgeois theorist.

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Notes
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8. Ibid., p. 196.
10. Ibid., pp. 248-51.
12. Ibid., 2.25, p. 327.
13. Ibid., 2.27, p. 329.
16. Ibid., pp. 211-12.
18. Ibid., 2.50, p. 344.
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21. Tully, pp. 4-34.

22. Ibid., p. 4

23. Ibid., p. 36.


25. Cf. Tully, op. cit., p. 44.

26. Ibid., p. 72.

27. Ibid., p. 54.

28. Ibid., pp. 61-3.

29. Ibid., pp. 62-94.

30. Ibid., pp. 66-8.

31. Ibid., pp. 35-50.

32. Ibid., p. 176.

33. Locke, op. cit., 2.120, p. 393; also Tully, op. cit., p. 164.

34. Tully, pp. 151-2.

35. Ibid., p. 151-2.


37. Cf. Dunn, The Political Thought . . . , op. cit., p. 79.


42. See Ian Shapiro and Jeffrey Isaac, "Realism and the History of Political Thought" (paper presented at the Annual Convention of the American Philosophical Association, December 1981).


44. Tully, p. 138.


47. As Marx observed: "for a society based upon the production of commodities, in which the producers in general enter into social relations with one another by treating their products as commodities and values, whereby they reduce their individual private labour to the standard of
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homogenous human labor — for such a society, Christianity, with its cultus of abstract man, more especially in its bourgeois developments, Protestantism, Deism, etc., is the most fitting form of religion.” *Capital*, vol. I (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 79.

48. Michael Oakeshott’s discussion of the modern concept of Societas is relevant here. According to Oakeshott, this concept denotes a human association “understood to be the product of a pact or an agreement, not to act in concert but to acknowledge the authority of certain conditions of acting.” In other words, it is a formal, not substantive unity. Oakeshott points out that in the Middle Ages the human race was referred to as a Societas, “where each man recognizes himself to be related to every other man in terms of a prescriptive law of Nature or God which he has not chosen and from obligations of which he cannot escape by a choice of his own.” Cf. *On Human Conduct* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 201-2. This would seem to aptly describe Locke’s system, where natural law functions as a set of formal prescriptions conditioning individual voluntaristic transactions. Hannah Arendt also has made a point of the modern development of “society” as a homogenized association of atomistic individuals, contrasting this with the unity of the Greek Polis. Cf. *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). For a discussion of the concept of relatively enduring relations and practices, see Anthony Giddens, *New Rules of Sociological Method* (New York: Basic Books, 1976); and Roy Bhaskar, *The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences* (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1979).


57. Locke, 2.85, p. 365.


59. Anthony Giddens suggests that power relations should be conceptualized as relations of autonomy and dependence, in other words that subordinate groups possess powers and are causally efficacious. *Central Problems in Social Theory* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 88-95. See also my “Beyond The ‘Three Faces’ of Power: A Realist Critique” (unpublished manuscript, 1982).

60. Tully, pp. 151-2.

61. Locke, 2.50, p. 344.


65. Locke, 2.34, p. 333.

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68. Cf. Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London: New Left Books, 1977), for a discussion of the difference between feudal and capitalist accumulation — while the latter is based upon the expansion of relative surplus value through the productive employment of labor, the former is largely based upon military conquest and territorial expansion.


70. See, for example, T.H. Green's remark in *Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract*, excerpted in Carl Cohen, ed., *Communism, Fascism, and Democracy* (New York: Random House, 1972). "Labor, the economist tells us, is a commodity exchangeable like other commodities. This is in a certain sense true, but it is a commodity which attaches in a peculiar manner to the person of a man. Hence restrictions may need to be placed on the sale of this commodity which would be unnecessary in other cases, in order to prevent labor from being sold under conditions which make it impossible for the person selling it ever to become a free contributor to social good in any form," p. 487. This viewpoint, which doesn't question the existence of a working class as an essentially subordinated and alienated class, only some of its effects, seems quite akin to Locke's approach, as Tully presents it. In both cases, state-implemented social welfare legislation would remedy social "problems."

71. For a similar argument, cf. Ross Poole, "Locke and the Bourgeois State." *Political Studies*, XXVII, 2 (June 1980).