

IN DEFENCE OF INTELLECTUAL CULTURE

Andrew Wernick

We don't want no education
We don't want no thought control
Hey! teacher, leave us kids alone
All in all you're just another brick in the wall

Pink Floyd

In my response to Ben Agger's essay on *Dialectical Sensibility* (*CJPST*, Vol. 1, nos. 2 & 3) I had hoped to bring into the open some important unresolved issues concerning the place of intellectuality and intellectual culture in a long-range transformative perspective. Unfortunately, his reply to my criticisms of populist intellectualism contains fewer arguments than symptoms: I clearly hit a raw nerve. Impatient with what he takes to be the underlying basis of my position, he foregoes a careful examination of my actual words and rushes straight into a denunciation of the sins they are supposed to connote — positivism, Leninism (which for Agger means Stalinism) and a blind defence of the ivory tower. Before commenting directly, then, on the matters at issue, it is necessary to clear up some misunderstandings.

Agger assumes that a defence of objectivity as an epistemological norm (and realism as an ontological norm) is tantamount to (a) a claim that the proponent of such a stance actually or potentially possesses absolute knowledge, (b) a claim by objectivists that they — or intellectuals in general — ought to rule, and (c) a denial of reflexivity. Assumptions (a) and (b) are *non sequiturs* and should not therefore have been ascribed. As for (c), no sophisticated objectivist in the social sciences — Marxist or otherwise — would deny that the subject, categories and process of knowledge are inextricably part of the object of knowledge itself. To put it provocatively: if I want to know myself, I — even as a verb — am also an object.

Agger's conflation of epistemological, ideological and political propositions also prevents him from correctly deciphering my political standpoint. He assumes that an insistence on instrumental rationality means thinking "about strategy only in terms of the mechanics of class struggle and not *also* in

ANDREW WERNICK

terms of the necessary emancipatory individuation of this class struggle on the level of lived experience." To the contrary, it is precisely because of my affinity for Agger's Marcusean interest in the requirements of a new radical sensibility that I thought it worthwhile to debate with him in the first place. Need it be pointed out that Gramsci, to whom Agger makes frequent appeal, was the perfect embodiment of a revolutionary strategist who combined a rational, even Leninist, approach to politics with a full appreciation of the need to effect an ideological and cultural transformation on the widest possible scale. With Agger, let me add, I am all for broadening, even universalising, the social basis and democratic mode of the directing political intelligence (although, with Gramsci, I assume that such direction is necessary). On the relation between cultural and class struggle, it would be foolish for any veteran of the sixties to urge the subordination of the former to the latter. On this score, I suspect that Agger — with the paramount importance he places on the spontaneous consciousness of blue- and white-collar workers — is actually more orthodox in his Marxism than I am.

My views on the Frankfurt School are similarly misinterpreted. Against my suggestion that the Frankfurt School was ultimately "successful in the practical goal it set itself," Agger counters: "To think that a single soul was rescued from the aura of the death camps by reading Adorno shows pitiable naivete." It would indeed; the works to which we were both referring (*Minima Moralia* and *Dialectic of Enlightenment*) were not available to the German public until after the War. My actual argument referred to the importance of critical theory in the rapid ideological development of the West German student movement in the early sixties.

Agger's systematic distortion of my position is not merely irritating; it also reveals flaws in his own methodology. Despite frequent use of the term dialectical, he seems to find it inconceivable that one who defends the values of objectivity, reason, intellectuality and so on, might nevertheless share his own objections to Leninist substitutionism, high cultural elitism and technocratic manipulation — and, from the same utopian, democratic and communitarian perspective. Moreover, one of the first principles of an "epistemological democracy," I would have thought, is that every authentically held point of view has its moment of truth. Far from adopting such an ecumenical approach, however, Agger wants to banish some viewpoints (e.g., anti-anti-intellectualism) from his republic altogether. Paradoxically, this *ex cathedra* excommunication is pronounced in the name of anti-authoritarianism.

In addition to all these misinterpretations, there are of course a number of issues on which we genuinely disagree. Here, I want simply to state a number of propositions that will make my own "proclivities" more explicit.

EXCHANGE

1. Leadership and Vanguard

A combined, many-sided and integrated development of all human activities is the emancipatory ideal; but the higher the collective level, the more a certain degree of individual specialisation is inevitable and even desirable. On a social scale, consciousness (like all human faculties) develops unevenly. Even if the historical causes of inequality were transcended, social, cultural and psychological asymmetries would still predispose the consciousnesses of some individuals and milieus to be relatively advanced. But consciousness, in this context, should not be identified with only one of its forms and levels; the law of uneven anthropological development applies to practical as well as theoretical consciousness, to qualities such as wisdom and ethical sensitivity as well as to socio-historical reflexivity, political intelligence, intersubjective skills, imaginative capacity and specific expertise in particular branches of technical or theoretical knowledge. Some of these capacities are complementary, but being advanced in one respect by no means guarantees being advanced in others. In short, there are as many vanguards as there are types of praxis. There is no single, overall vanguard, nor — in view of the immense complexity of human activities and faculties — can there be. In principle, given a multiplicity of independently established status hierarchies and with the removal of social obstacles to individual growth, the goal of inter-personal status equality would be compatible with the actuality of asymmetry and unevenness in collective cultural development.

The problem of status, however, must be distinguished from that of leadership, which is more intractable. Surmounting evolutionary problems and even day-to-day problem-solving would be impossible if the rational authority of those with the greatest scientific, technological, political or ideological grasp were never respected. But leadership, which confers power can not be regarded as a simple extension of the spontaneous division of labour. Under the circumstances, there can be no permanent resolution of the familiar contradiction at the heart of progressive political theory between the principles of democracy and rational leadership. The extent to which the latter function can be collectivised to the point where it is exercised by the policy as a whole can only be a matter for experiment by future generations. In practice, we must, as Mao puts it, “grasp both ends.”

In view of the human capacity for self-deception, leadership can only be granted, not unilaterally assumed; and even so, the conferral of authority may be misguided. Self-appointed leaders (Gautama, Socrates and Jesus are ironic exceptions) are rarely the genuine article. Political struggles require direction and coordination; but whatever the instrumental exigencies, unobtrusive leadership (by individuals and collectivities) is always the least offensive. Lao Tzu, characterising “the best of all rulers,” notes that

ANDREW WERNICK

When his task is accomplished and his work done
The people will all say: 'It happened naturally'.

Tao Te Ching

The *Tao Te Ching* is feudal and quietist, but *mutatis mutandis* there is a message here also for activists in a democracy.

2. On Intellectual Improvement

Human differences in developed mental capacity — in the powers of reason and reflection — are, among all the natural distinctions, the most invidious. A discussion of raising the collective intellectual level will therefore always seem arrogant and undemocratic. On the other hand, to treat the oedipally charged *ressentiment* of the intellectually dominated and frustrated as a regulative ideal converts this necessary egalitarian unease into a veritable taboo on the topic. Such single-minded anti-élitism creates a blind spot in the transformative critique.

North Americans, so it is said, on the average watch six hours of network TV per day and spend four hours per year reading serious literature. The figure of the intellectual (especially when fused with that of the Bohemian) has replaced the Jew as the main target of mass psychological hostility in advanced capitalism. More is at fault here than the self-distantiation of intellectual workers from the masses. The mind-body split that two centuries of social critics have detected to be at the psychotic centre of Western culture in the bourgeois epoch manifests itself not only in sexual repression (which we now understand) and in the extrusion of certain forms of intellectual practice from direct intercourse with "the real world" (which is less true of North America than of "older" regions like Europe) — but also in the repression of intellectuality and of the gratifications associated with it in the daily life experiences of the masses. Anti-intellectualism — i.e., prejudice towards ideas and those who bear them — is a self-negating expression of instinctual frustration, an unlovely element in the psychology of the oppressed.

Confining people's intellectual development to the unreflective level at which advanced capitalism requires the majority to operate, and focussing their hostility on ideas or individuals that disrupt the general torpor, is of obvious benefit to the business, military and political elites who really rule. But it is not only a capitalist problem. The repressive state-socialist regimes of the East also foster a climate of opinion antagonistic to intellectuals and independent thought. There, the effect is achieved through overt ideological controls. In advanced capitalism, mass stupefaction and ideological intolerance, which is characteristic of an alienated work process, is served and

EXCHANGE

reinforced by a commoditised culture industry. Mass media programming colonises audiences both for advertisers and for the merchandisers of popular entertainment. Reawakening the community's dormant powers of reflection is a necessary moment in the long-range project of achieving collective self-determination. Conversely, catering to anti-intellectualism represents a capitulation to present and future authoritarianisms.

3. On the Social Division of Labour

The peculiar passion of those who insist on the necessity of abolishing the division of labour is the desire to dethrone intellectual practice from its privileged social position, and to break the domination of those whose monopoly over intellectual tasks excludes the majority from effective day-to-day decision-making power. The aim is unimpeachable, but the issue — even in the abstract — is more complicated than first appears.

Above all, it is important to distinguish between the problems of domination, status, functional differentiation, individual specialisation and social mobility. It is one thing to abolish the coercive power exercised by one social group (or type of practice) over another, and quite a different thing to abolish differentiated social activities as such, or the subcultures and idiolects that crystallise around them. And the question posed by Durkheim concerning the relative merits of specialisation and generalism is another issue again. To subsume these quite separate problems under one umbrella — the division of labour: should it be abolished? — eliminates all the ground between blind defence of the status quo and abstract negation. Marx's discussion of the question in the *1844 Manuscripts* and in the *German Ideology* leaves a confused impression precisely because he does not make the necessary distinctions. Hence his conception of communism, for all its stress on the omni-sided unfolding of individual human potential, is still susceptible to regressive utopian longings. In the language of fantasy, abolishing the division of labour means abolishing the boundary between ego and other, and in the language of political theory it means primitive communism and a return to tribal unity. This does not imply that the dream (the promise of happiness) should be suppressed in the name of an impoverished reality; but rather that as we experimentally attempt to deconstruct coercive elements of human association, we should not let the unconscious, unreflected, dictate our political drives.

4. The Future of Academia

Among the functions of the capitalist university today are: the allocation of individuals into the upper reaches of the occupational hierarchy;

ANDREW WERNICK

reproduction of the cultural values and class outlooks appropriate to professional and managerial destinations; and mobilisation of knowledge production in the service of “private” industry and the state. To those at the bottom of the class structure, education is indeed “just another brick in the wall”: a barrier to social mobility, a propaganda machine for the institutions and interests which subordinate them, and a mandarinat which stamps them as inferior cultural products. Under the circumstances, the pretensions of higher education to represent higher spiritual values (the disinterested pursuit of truth, etc.) is pious rhetoric.

So what is to be done? Tear down the wall and, following Illich, de-school society? The conclusion, especially when applied to post-secondary institutions, is unwarranted. First, because it is implausible to suppose that a high technology civilisation can dispense with organised centres of scientific education and research; while less immediately utilitarian, the same is true of the cultural and social knowledge (imperfectly) produced and transmitted by the social sciences and humanities. In this context, the democratic imperative points not to academia’s self-liquidation but to the need for universal access to university resources, and for more socially accountable forms of academic self-management. Secondly, the fact that the university’s charter functions are vitiated in practice does not invalidate them in principle.

The problem is that the university’s positive functions in the (re)production of short- and long-range intellectual use-values, are subverted by the class context and alienated mode in which the whole educational system is set. In this respect, the forces of capitalism and bureaucracy oppress even the relatively privileged intellectual workers within the academy itself — and not just because of guilt occasioned by blatant academic complicity in the evils of the world. Besides the general lack of cultural support for intellectual work, the invasion of pedagogy by market categories (curriculum planning as a Nielsen ratings game) and the reification of work relations, as the “community of scholars” becomes a corporate enterprise, serve to undermine universities as authentic intellectual centres, and to alienate the everyday activity of all those who work in them.

Far from there being, therefore, an irreconcilable gulf between the human interests of academia and the not-yet community it ideally serves, there is ultimately a convergence in the common need for academic and intellectual reconstruction (and for the broader changes that would make that possible). The bricks are a building as well as a wall: for those of us whose legitimate vocation it is to live in that building, the problem is how to make it into a place of human habitation.

Sociology
Trent University

SCHMITT SCHOLARSHIP*

George Schwab

I

Until recently anyone interested in gathering information about Carl Schmitt in the English-speaking world had no choice but to turn to the standard literature written by well known political scientists and historians, some of whom exerted enormous influence on the American intellectual scene. A number of them, including Carl Joachim Friedrich and Franz Neumann, knew Schmitt personally or were well acquainted with his work.

It is not surprising — given his originality, his large intellectual output and his support of Bruening's measures against the Nazis and Schleicher's endeavors to outflank Hitler — Schmitt should have enjoyed wide respect and even admiration especially in Weimar Germany and Europe in general. But all this changed when Schmitt decided to participate in the Nazi venture after the Reichstag extended to Hitler an enabling act in March 1933 that was unprecedented in scope. Understandably, the attitude of a number of his former students, friends and followers who were forced to flee Germany shifted. It was their extreme disappointment with Schmitt's decision that led them to attack him bitterly, so much so that dispassionate discourse about Schmitt and his work became impossible. The forms that the attack assumed included questioning Schmitt's integrity, concealing some of his ideas, distorting others, and even appropriating his concepts without acknowledgement. A few examples will suffice to illustrate the extent to which the medium of scholarship was enlisted to serve nonscholarly ends.

*This paper constitutes, in shortened form, the foreword to four of my works on Carl Schmitt which appeared in Japanese translation in December 1979: "Enemy oder Foe: Der Konflikt der modernen Politik," tr. J. Zeumer, in *Epirrhosis: Festgabe für Carl Schmitt*, ed. H. Barion et al., Berlin, 1968, vol. II; *The Challenge of the Exception: An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt between 1921 and 1936*, Berlin, 1970; "Carl Schmitt: Political Opportunist?" *Intellect*, Vol. 103 (February 1975); and the introduction to my translation of Schmitt's *The Concept of the Political*, New Brunswick, N.J. 1976.

Editor's Note: Professor Schwab's manuscript provides further historical siting of the reception met by Carl Schmitt's writings in North America. For further discussion of the Schmitt controversy, see Joseph W. Bendersky, "Carl Schmitt Confronts the English-Speaking World," *CJPST*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Fall/Autome, 1978), 125-135.

GEORGE SCHWAB

Although Carl Joachim Friedrich was not a Nazi victim, his treatment of one of Schmitt's major works, *Die Diktatur. Von den Anfängen des modernen Souveränitätsgedankens bis zum proletarischen Klassenkampf*,¹ is interesting to follow. In an article that Friedrich published in the October 1930 issue of *Foreign Affairs* under the title "Dictatorship in Germany?" he characterized Schmitt as "one of the most acute constitutional theorists"² and stated that the second edition of *Die Diktatur* (1928) constituted "an epoch-making discussion to which the writer [Friedrich] is indebted for important suggestions."³ From Friedrich's discussion it is clear that he subscribes to Schmitt's distinction between a commissarial and a sovereign form of dictatorship, a distinction that Schmitt had made and elaborated in the first edition of *Die Diktatur* (1921). Whereas a sovereign dictatorship, according to Schmitt, is one in which a ruler exploits a crisis to destroy a constitution in order to bring a new constitution into existence, a commissarial dictatorship aims at putting an end to a crisis so that the existing constitution can in its entirety be restored and serve as the basic law of the land. In discussing the nature of President Hindenburg's rule, Friedrich treated it entirely within the framework of Schmitt's distinction and even used Schmitt's language to state that governmental rule based on Article 48 of the Weimar constitution could never be interpreted to mean the "destruction of the constitution."⁴

However, a reader of Friedrich's much studied *Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and America* was told in the first edition, which appeared in 1937,⁵ that in *Die Diktatur* (Friedrich's reference was to the second edition that appeared in 1928) Schmitt "attempts a comprehensive synthesis, but unfortunately his theoretical analysis is marred by his preoccupation with 'political' considerations of the moment — at that time the justification of more extended presidential powers."⁶ In the second edition of *Constitutional Government and Democracy*, published in 1941,⁷ Friedrich dismisses Schmitt's *Die Diktatur* as a "partisan tract."⁸ Notwithstanding the fact that Friedrich steadfastly used Schmitt's categorization, no reference to *Die Diktatur* is to be found in one of the subsequent editions that appeared in 1968.⁹

In comparison to the approach adopted by Friedrich, the attack by Franz Neumann was more sophisticated. Because of his brilliance and his commitment to teaching, Neumann decisively influenced many students. In addition, his major work, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933-1944*,¹⁰ continues to shape the American perception of the Third Reich. Publishing *Behemoth* at the height of World War II, Neumann evidently felt compelled to settle accounts with his former teacher and friend.

In *Behemoth* Neumann concerned himself with three of Schmitt's notions: decisionism, the friend-enemy criterion of politics and the distinction between liberalism and democracy.

EXCHANGE

The decisionism that Schmitt developed in some of his writings of the Weimar period was based on his definition that the "sovereign is he who decides on the exception."¹¹ He derived his decisionism largely from his concern about the centrifugal forces that were responsible for undermining the powers of the sovereign, on the one hand, and from his controversy with Hans Kelsen's pure normativism, on the other hand. Basically the two are linked. In contrast to Kelsen's insistence that "the concept of sovereignty must be radically banished" (*Der Souveränitätsbegriff muss radikal verdrängt werden*),¹² Schmitt aimed at breaking open Kelsen's system by including in it the exception. This meant, of course, not removing from juridical consideration the sovereign's right to declare an exception and act accordingly.

The unity of Schmitt's political thought that emerged from his answers to problems facing Weimar is best reflected in his criterion of politics as the distinction between friend and enemy.¹³ Just as in the domestic domain so also in the power-political arena of states, sovereignty cannot be dissociated from decisionism. In the sovereign's endeavor to ensure order, peace and stability at home, and simultaneously safeguard the territorial integrity of the state, circumstances may dictate that the sovereign decide who the enemy/ies is/are and act accordingly.¹⁴

It would not be unfair to say that despite Neumann's thorough knowledge of Schmitt's works and the context in which he developed his ideas, he distorted Schmitt's political realism. Although it is true that Schmitt's ideas can lead to extremes, it is utterly without foundation to claim that Schmitt who, above all, craved order, peace and stability, had intended his decisionism to be a doctrine that demanded "action instead of deliberation . . . decision instead of evaluation."¹⁵ Moreover, it was a distortion on the part of Neumann to assert that Schmitt's friend-enemy distinction was a "doctrine of brute force in its most striking form."¹⁶

Schmitt's distinction between liberalism and democracy did not fare any better with Neumann. A thesis now in vogue — that liberalism destroys democracy and democracy liberalism¹⁷ — was advanced by Schmitt in 1923.¹⁸ Schmitt's fear was that political parties hostile to the Weimar state would tear it apart or subvert it by using that part of the Weimar constitution that enabled such parties to thrive and compete for power. To prevent that from happening and thus to preserve and strengthen the Weimar state, Schmitt argued that the constitution deserved to be developed according to its inner logic — that is, that the democratic part be developed at the expense of the liberal part. Cognizant, however, that constitutional revisions would take a long time to bring about, Schmitt argued that in order for Weimar to survive, its president must not be hampered from acting decisively. And, according to Schmitt, the Weimar constitution in general, and Article 48 in particular,

GEORGE SCHWAB

provided the president with both the means and the legal base to act accordingly.¹⁹ Time and again Schmitt warned that unless the problems caused by the inconsistencies in the constitution were resolved and unless the authorities immediately ceased to subscribe to the narrow interpretation of the constitution advanced by the formalists, "truth [would] avenge itself" (*dann rächt sich die Wahrheit*).²⁰

Though Neumann knew precisely the context that had led Schmitt to distinguish between liberalism and democracy and to plead for a strong presidency as a bulwark of Weimar, Neumann turned Schmitt's ideas upside down and claimed that his distinction between liberalism and democracy was a "sham" and that Schmitt was an "ideologist"²¹ who provided National Socialism with the ammunition in the 1920s and early 1930s to parade "as the salvation of democracy."²² Furthermore, Neumann interpreted Schmitt's attempts to strengthen the presidency in the fight against the antagonists of the Weimar state as a "deliberate maneuver" to give "all power to the president."²³

It is interesting to note the views that Neumann held, at least prior to 1933, on some of Schmitt's notions that Neumann subsequently distorted and condemned during World War II. On the distinction between liberalism and democracy, Neumann wrote to Schmitt on September 7, 1932, that he shared with him the fear that parties hostile to Weimar would succeed in tearing it apart. According to Neumann, rule by parliamentary means would become impossible if it turned out that "the basic political contrast in Germany is the economic . . . that the decisive friend-enemy grouping is the grouping of labor and property." "Parliamentary democracy," he agreed with Schmitt, "can function only as long as it is possible to adhere to the principle of the equal chance. Were this principle to fail . . . then the parliamentary lawgiving state must necessarily fail to function as well." To forestall Weimar from being torn to shreds, Neumann agreed with Schmitt that the "constitution deserved to be freed of its contradictions . . . and developed coherently, that is, according to its inner logic." Neumann reminded Schmitt that he, Neumann, had been trying, "even if not very thoroughly," to "develop a leading principle from the maze of contradictions in the second part" of the constitution. "I doubt, however," Neumann continued "if there is still enough time to develop the substance of the second part. This substance cannot be the order of a bourgeois *Rechtsstaat*. . . . According to the wording of the second part it can only be an order that is based on freedom and property." Without doubt, such an order had to "be sustained and preserved through the participation of all productive elements in society [*Volkskreise*]."²⁴

The writings of Friedrich and Neumann are characteristic of how the record has been distorted, legends propagated and scholarship set back about the person and work of Carl Schmitt. The hostile attitude towards Schmitt has

EXCHANGE

been diluted, however, by occasional references that were objective, even if brief. For example, without referring to Neumann, Clinton Rossiter challenged the implication of Neumann's remarks concerning one of Schmitt's major ideas about how to save the Weimar. By stating in *Behemoth* that Schmitt's attempts to strengthen the presidency constituted nothing but a "deliberate maneuver" on the part of Schmitt to concentrate all power in the president, Neumann insinuated that Schmitt was glorifying power for the sake of power. In analyzing the narrow interpretation of Article 48 by legalists such as Hans Nawiasky,²⁵ and Schmitt's latitudinarian interpretation of Article 48, according to which the president would be given wide powers to enable him to confront crises successfully, Rossiter did not hesitate to conclude in 1948 that "In actual practice, even when German democracy was at its strongest, [Schmitt's] . . . thesis was nearer the facts than was the strict and legalistic point of view."²⁶

On a related constitutional issue, namely, on measures assuming the force of law, Frederick M. Watkins correctly pointed out in 1939, years before the appearance of *Behemoth*, that for a good part of the Weimar period Schmitt argued that Article 48 did not give the president the right to decree formal laws. Passing ordinary laws was the prerogative of the Reichstag, according to Schmitt. The thesis that measures not be extended to the field of legislation is one with which Western liberals would feel completely at home. Said Watkins, the rejection of Schmitt's thesis and the "acceptance for so extended an interpretation of Article 48 . . . were serious in the extreme."²⁷

However brief Rossiter's and Watkin's comments were, their scholarly detachment was a relief and certainly constituted sound directional signals for scholarly research. It was in this context, too, that I remember having been startled by a brief and yet extremely revealing reference to Schmitt by the late Hannah Arendt in 1951. To the best of my knowledge, she was the first person in the English-speaking world who, in her celebrated *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, committed to paper the fact that Schmitt was not a true Nazi and was, in fact, replaced in the middle thirties "by the Nazis' own brand of political and legal theorists, such as Hans Frank, the late governor of Poland, Gottfried Neesse, and Reinhard Hoehn."²⁸

A giant step toward paving the way for a reassessment of Schmitt came in 1965. Without even one word of explanation, the late Leo Strauss had his well known 1932 discussion entitled "Comments on Carl Schmitt's *Der Begriff des Politischen*" translated²⁹ and published in his *Spinoza's Critique of Religion*.³⁰ By drawing the English reader's attention to the affinity between Hobbes and Schmitt (leading scholars have even characterized Schmitt as the Hobbes of the twentieth century³¹), Strauss obviously wanted to serve notice that notwithstanding Schmitt's terrible utterances of the Nazi period, the

GEORGE SCHWAB

cause of scholarship could not be served by distorting, inventing or omitting the rich body of thought that is contained in Schmitt's voluminous writings.

Columbia University

Notes

1. Munich/Leipzig, 1921, 1928; Berlin, 1964.
2. Vol. 9, no. 1, p. 131.
3. *Ibid.*, note 15, p. 129.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 130.
5. The first edition appeared under the title *Constitutional Government and Politics: Nature and Development*.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 534-535.
7. Boston.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 627.
9. Waltham, Mass./Toronto/London.
10. The first edition published by Oxford University Press appeared in New York in 1942. The same firm published a second edition in 1944. The volume has been reprinted since in hardcover (New York: Octagon Books, 1963) and in paperback (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966; New York: Octagon Books, 1972).
11. *Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität*, Munich/Leipzig, 1922, 1934, p. 11.
12. *Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts*, Tübingen, 1920, p. 120.
13. *The Concept of the Political*, trans., intro., notes by George Schwab. With comments on Schmitt's essay by Leo Strauss, New Brunswick, N.J., 1976, *passim*. Fearful that the uninitiated reader may confuse Schmitt's criterion with a definition of politics or the political (on the distinction between "politics" and "political" see my introduction to *The Concept of the Political*, pp. 12-16), Piet Tommissen calls attention to the places in *The Concept of the Political* where Schmitt, instead of using the word "criterion," speaks of a definition. See Tommissen's "Schmitt et la polemologie" in *Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto — Revue européenne des sciences sociales*, Tome XVI, No. 44, 1978, p. 148. I do not, however, share Tommissen's great concern. Almost at the outset Schmitt clearly states that it must be understood as "a definition in the sense of a criterion and not as an exhaustive definition or one indicative of substantial content," *The Concept of the Political*, p. 26.
14. *The Concept of the Political*, *passim*.
15. *Behemoth*, New York, 1966, p. 45.
16. *Ibid.*
17. See, for example, Alan Wolfe, *The Limits of Legitimacy*, New York/London, 1977, p. 7, *passim*.
18. *Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus*, Munich/Leipzig, 1923, 1926; Berlin, 1961, 1969.
19. See, in particular, the appendix to the second edition of Schmitt's *Die Diktatur* (1928, 1964), pp. 213ff.

EXCHANGE

20. *Legalität und Legitimität*, Munich/Leipzig, 1932; Berlin, 1968, p. 98. See also Joseph W. Bendersky, "Carl Schmitt in the Summer of 1932: A Re-examination," *Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto* . . . , pp. 35-53. By showing that in the months before Hitler's accession to power, Schmitt was associated with Schleicher's endeavors to thwart Hitler's climb to power, Bendersky decisively refutes the widespread legend that Schmitt paved the way for Hitler's acquisition of power.
21. *Behemoth*, p. 43.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
24. This letter is in Professor Schmitt's personal files, and a photostatic copy is in my possession. In Schmitt's concept of the "equal chance," only those political parties should be given the right to compete for . . . seats in parliament and for governmental power that would not, upon [their] gaining control, deny other parties a similar chance to compete for power. *Legalität und Legitimität*, pp. 30ff.
25. The thesis of the legalists can be summarized as follows: with the exception of the seven articles enumerated in Section 2 of Article 48, all other articles were sacrosanct and even immune from presidential measures.
26. *Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies*, Princeton, 1948; New York, 1963, p. 69.
27. *The Failure of Constitutional Emergency Powers under the German Republic*, Cambridge, Mass., 1939, p. 19. In Schmitt's construction of his presidential system as a last resort to save Weimar he, too, by 1931, began to subscribe to the dominant view that measures may also have the force of ordinary legislation.
28. New York, 1951, note 66, p. 332. There have been numerous editions and reprints of this study.
29. Originally it appeared in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, Vol. 67, no. 6, pp. 732-749, under the title "Anmerkungen zu Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen."
30. New York, 1965, pp. 331-351.
31. See, for example, Helmut Rumpf, *Carl Schmitt und Thomas Hobbes, Ideelle Beziehungen und aktuelle Bedeutung mit einer Abhandlung über: Die Frühschriften Carl Schmitts*, Berlin, 1972, pp. 56-60.

Books, et al., Received

- Storytelling and Mythmaking: Images from Film and Literature*, Frank McConnell, Oxford University Press, cloth \$18.75, pp. viii, 303.
- The Veil and the Mask: Essays on Culture and Ideology*, J.G. Merquior, Routledge and Kegan Paul, cloth \$24.50, pp. xii, 161.
- Machiavelli's New Modes and Orders: A Study of the "Discourses on Livy,"* Cornell University Press, cloth \$25.00, pp. 460.
- Police Cooperation and Performance: The Greater St. Louis Interlocal Experience*, James C. McDavid, Pennsylvania State University Press, paper \$4.50, pp. 92.
- Barbarism with a Human Face*, Bernard-Henry Levy, Harper and Row, cloth \$12.95, pp. xii, 210.
- The Dissimulating Harmony: The Image of Interpretation in Nietzsche, Rilke, Artaud and Benjamin*, Carol Jacobs, Johns Hopkins University Press, cloth \$8.95, pp. xvii, 131.
- Woman's Creation: Sexual Evolution and the Shaping of Society*, Elizabeth Fisher, Doubleday, cloth \$16.50, pp. 484.
- The Sociology of Rock*, Simon Frith, Constable, cloth \$11.95, pp. 255.
- Getting Sex*, John Alan Lee, General, paper \$8.95, pp. 318.
- Street-Level Bureaucracy*, Michael Lipsky, Russell Sage Foundation, cloth \$10.00, pp. xiii, 244.
- The English Fact in Quebec*, Sheila McLeod Arnopoulos/Dominique Clift, McGill-Queen's University Press, cloth \$17.95, paper \$7.95, pp. xvi, 239.
- Economy and Self*, Norman Fischer, Greenwood Press, cloth, pp. x, 264.
- The State Elite*, Dennis Olsen, McClelland & Steward Ltd., cloth \$14.95, pp. 153.
- The Rights of Reason*, Susan Meld Shell, University of Toronto Press, cloth \$13.50, pp. xi, 205.

The Greek Legacy, T.M. Robinson, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, paper, pp. viii, 135.

The Idea File of Harold Adams Innis, William Christian, University of Toronto Press, cloth \$20.00, paper \$7.50, pp. xxi, 287.

Measurement in the Social Sciences: The Link Between Theory and Data, Richard A. Zeller and Edward G. Carmines, Cambridge University Press, cloth \$26.95, paper \$7.95, pp. x, 197.

Power and Change in Canada, Richard J. Ossenberg, McClelland and Stewart, paper \$11.95, pp. 294.

Intellectuals and Politics, Robert J. Brym, George Allen & Unwin, Inc., cloth \$14.95, paper \$6.95, pp. 87.

Pluralism and Corporatism: Political Evolution of Modern Democracies, Reginald J. Harrison, George Allen & Unwin, Inc., cloth \$22.50, paper \$9.95, pp. 198.

The Middle East in World Affairs, George Lenczowski, Cornell University Press, paper, pp. 863.

Resources for Feminist Research, Volume 8, Number 3, published quarterly by Ontario Institute for Studies in Education.