The Technology Of Uselessness
Critical Art Ensemble
I am useless, but God loves me. - Mike Kelly
The expectation that technology will one day exist as pure utility is
an assumption that frequently surfaces in collective thought on the
development of society and social relations. This prospect has
typically suggested two opposite scenarios of the future. On one hand,
there is the utopian millenium predicted by modern thinkers who were
guided by belief in progress; this concept slowly began to supplant
belief in the concept of providence during the 17th and 18th centuries.
Both concepts were characterized by belief in the unilinear development
of the human race, but providence was a force that was expected to
result in spiritual, rather than in economic autonomy. The engine of
providence was considered the guiding hand of God (which was later
amputated and stitched to the cyborg of capitalism by Adam Smith). In
Early Modernity, when belief in providence began giving way to belief
in progress, intellectuals and scholars were debating whether the
social utopia of the future should be based on spiritual or on secular
principles. Philosophers searched for an independent force in the
universe that could save the earthly population from its economic
shortcomings and its spiritual privation. Thomas More constructed a
rather dubious literary utopia that marked the beginning of the shift
from God/Christ to science/technology as savior. From More's
perspective, neither of the two choices seemed particularly satisfying.
Given the choice between El Dorado and the regime of Mahomet the
Prophet, Voltaire found the former more tolerable. This type of thought
which valued secular human advancement and cast doubt on spiritual
systems began to tip the scales of judgment in favor of science and
technology, but certainly no celebration accompanied this shift. With
the coming of the industrial revolution, the scales tipped decisively
in favor of science and technology once and for all. At last, a
foreseeable end was imagined to the problem of production - soon there
would be enough goods for everyone, and with such surplus, competition
over scarce goods would cease. The idea of progress began to flourish
from this point on. Both the left (Condorcet and Saint-Simon) and the
right (Comte and Spencer) shared an optimism about the future in spite
of the wildly divergent destinies predicted by each - for example,
council socialism was anticipated by Saint-Simon, and the appearance of
the bourgeois Ubermensch was expected by Spencer.
Let us not forget Marx in this thumbnail sketch. Although Marx was not
one to wax utopian very often, he did have his moments. Marx believed
that the factory system would solve problems of production (i.e.,
scarcity); however, he foresaw a new problem, that of distribution. The
crisis in distribution would in turn lead to revolution, by which means
the victorious workers would restructure the exploitive routes of
bourgeois distribution. Such speculation has continued to manifest
itself even later, in utopian visions well exemplified by Rene Clair in
the film A Nous la Liberte. The film depicts a time after
the glorious revolution when the workers enjoy the fruits of zero work,
and live only to celebrate, to drink, and to sing, while the machines
work dutifully, producing the goods needed to carry this utopia into a
shining future. One of the main currents in modern art (Futurism,
Constructivism, and Bauhaus) illustrated this soon-to-come secular
utopia. All the same, it would be quite unfair to hang the sometimes
shameful optimism of the 20th century on Marx. Although he demonstrated
how rationalized capitalist economy would end the problem of
production, he also realized that people could not be satisfied by
goods alone. Marx foresaw that in the epoch of capitalism, although
production rates would rise, so would the degree of alienation from our
own human nature, from economic process, from economic products, and
from other social beings. In terms of individuals' psychic condition,
things would not get better, but would grow tortuously worse. For Marx,
once other variables besides production were examined, unilinear social
advancement was not to be found.
This brings us to the second scenario - the pessimists' dystopia. This
point of view seems to gain new proponents with each new mechanized
and/or electronic war. Yet even when the idea of progress was at its
apex, before the military catastrophes of the 20th century, some
critics of the idea were already predicting that human 'advancement'
would end in disaster. First and foremost was Ferdinand Toennies, who
argued that advanced technology would only serve to increase the
complexity of the division of labor (society), which in turn would
strip people of all the institutions that are the basis of human
community (family, friendship, public space, etc). After World War I,
Oswald Spengler was among the leaders of this line of thought. To his
mind, advanced technology and sprawling cities were not indications of
progress; rather, they were indicators of the final moments of
civilization - one that has hit critical mass and is about to burn
itself out. The great sociologist Pitirim Sorokin summed up this
perspective in The Crisis of Our Age when he stated:
Neither happiness, nor safety and security, nor even
material comfort has been realized. In few periods of human history
have so many millions of persons been so unhappy, so insecure, so
hungry and destitute, as at the present time, all the way from China to
Western Europe.
Here then are the two sides, forever in opposition. Today the two
antithetical opinions continue to manifest themselves throughout
culture. Corporate futurologists sing the praises of computerized
information management, satellite communications, biotechnology, and
cybernetics; such technological miracles, they assure us, will make
life easier as new generations of technology are designed and produced
to meet social and economic needs with ever-greater efficiency. On the
other hand, the concerns of pessimists, neoluddites, retreatists, and
technophobes ring out, warning that humanity will not control the
machines, but that the machines will control humanity. In more fanciful
(generally Hollywood) moments, the new dystopia is envisioned as a
world where people are caught in the evil grip of a self-conscious
intelligent machine, one that either forces them into slavery, or even
worse, annihilates the human race.
These are the two most common narratives of social evolution in regard
to technology. For the utopians, the goal of progress is similar to the
vision of Rene Clair - technology should become a transparent backdrop
that will liberate us from the forces of production, so that we might
engage in free hedonistic pursuits. For the dystopians, technology
represents a state apparatus that is out of control - the war machine
has been turned on, no one knows how to turn it off, and it is running
blindly toward the destruction of humanity.
Evidence can certainly be found to support both of these visions, but a
third possibility exists, one that is seldom mentioned because it lacks
the emotional intensity of the other two. To expand on the suggestion
of Georges Bataille, could the end of technological progress be neither
apocalypse nor utopia, but simply uselessness? Pure technology in this
case would not be an active agent that benefits or hurts mankind: it
could not be, as it has no function. Pure technology, as opposed to
pure utility, is never turned on; it just sits, existing in and of
itself. Unlike the machines of the utopians and dystopians, not only is
it free of humanity, it is free of its own machine function - it serves
no practical purpose for anyone or anything.
Where are these machines? They are everywhere - in the home, in the
workplace, and even in places that can only be imagined. So many people
have become so invested in seeing technology as a manifestation of
value or anti-value, that they have failed to see that much of
technology does nothing at all.
Recently, there has been considerable fascination with the perception
that most people cannot learn to operate their video tape decks. As one
comedian put it, "I just bought a VCR for $400, and can't figure out
how to work it. $400 is just too much for a clock that only blinks
12:00." This situation is certainly exaggerated, but there is an
interesting point of truth in it. To program many of the functions on a
VCR requires skills beyond those of the average consumer. When video
first hit the consumer markets, the belief was that everyone would soon
have a TV studio in his or her house (along with a jet pack). The home
TV studio would mark the end of progress in video production. Instead,
VCRs filled with useless computer chips now gather cobwebs in home
entertainment centers. For example, consider the existence of a chip
which allows a VCR to be programmed for a month in advance; this is
actually nothing more than an homage to the useless. It simply exists
in and of itself, having no real life function. Most programming
information is not generally available a month in advance, and even if
it were, why would someone need to tape a month's worth of television
programs, and who would remember the appropriate times to insert new
blank tapes?
Why such a chip was made in the first place falls into a web of
possibility that is difficult to untangle. First, the perverse desires
that consumers associate with utility should not be underestimated.
Driven by spectacularized engines of desire, consumers want more for
their money - even if what they get is something that will never be
used. The corporate answer is to meet a cliche with a cliche: Give
customers what they want. Consequently, the marketing departments of
corporations, in their struggle for market share in the electronics
industry, force their engineers and designers to create new products
laden with extra features. One main selling point: Our machine has the
most features for the money. The question for the consumer is: "Did I
get a good deal [i.e., the most for the money]?" The question of "Can I
actually use what I buy?" is never raised. The corporations know of the
desire for the useless (a desire that can never be fulfilled), and
comply by heaping on their products as much useless gadgetry as
possible in order to seduce the bargain-hungry consumer. And so the
cycle starts.
The cycle begins to spiral as new generations of technology are
introduced - in this case depurified technology. The slogan of one
electronics company - "so smart, it's simple" - is symbolic of
depurification. The corporation is, in a sense, announcing that its
technology actually has a use. Consumers can buy it not just for the
sake of having it, but because they will be able to make it do
something. The slogan also signals that consumers are buying the
privilege of being stupid (the ultimate commodity in the realm
of conspicuous consumption). There will be no manuals to read, no
assembly, no understanding required. The manual is the TV commercial
for the product. Having seen it, consumers can make the product
function.
While the buying patterns of those seduced by pure technology are
guided by a perverse consumer activism, thoroughly corrupted by the
Veblenesque nightmare of conspicuous consumption, the patterns of those
buying impure technology are guided by a need to keep the apparatus of
use as invisible as possible, so as not to interrupt the trajectory of
one's 'lifestyle.' This attempt to return to impure technology
eventually backfires, and the spiral becomes a circle again. The
consumer zeal for simple technology that will not distract from daily
tasks is too easily rechanneled into specialized products that rarely
deliver the convenience that is so desperately sought. Two types of
products emerge from this variety of artificially generated desire.
First there is the product that is a con, such as an electric martini
shaker. This is one case where the old fashioned way works just as well
if not better. The second type is exemplified by a consumer-grade pasta
making machine. One evening at home with this gizmo will quickly teach
a person the meaning of labor intensification. This is not a technology
of convenience. Either way, these pieces of bourgeois wonder will take
their rightful place in upper cabinets and in closets as useless pieces
of bric-a- brac that did not even serve the function of delivering
enriched consumer privation. Unlike the VCR chip, these pieces of
technology require human contact before they achieve purity.
In all cases, the desire that consumer economy (the economy of surplus)
has most successfully tapped is the need for excess, that is, the need
to have so much that it is beyond human use. Pleasure is derived
through negation - by not using a product. This form of excess
is the privilege of those who enjoy the surplus of production. Although
the bourgeoisie has never achieved the purity of uselessness of
previous leisure classes, they still aspire with great fear, and with
very little success, to total counterproduction. This class typically
falls short of the upper level of the hierarchy of master and slave so
aptly articulated by Hegel. The products which members of this class
consume transform themselves into stand-ins for the obscene debauchery
of excess, in which, they, as chieftains, should personally
participate. The cowardice of the bourgeoisie can never be
underestimated. Confronted with the opportunity to test the limits of
the possible, they instead let things take their place in the realm of
the useless. Within this realm, the products of counterproduction
acquire a being analogous to that of the sacred in 'primitive'
cultures, and become the icons of secular transcendentalism,
accumulating mana by controlling the lives of those around them. The
uncanny notion that technology which is out of sight and out of mind
best defines human existence within the economy of desire is one that
is typically resisted by commonsense thought. As William James and
Alfred Schutz proposed in their own unique ways, the principle of
practicality structures everyday life. Objects are perceived first and
foremost in terms of their instrumental value. In constructing a model
of individual existence centered around perception, there can be little
doubt that the visible will be at the center and the invisible at the
margins. Within the middle ground, utility is the primary governing
factor. Hence, within this visible realm, the consumption of excess and
excess consumption maintains an element of practicality. For example, a
wealthy person buys a luxury car. Although it may have many useless
elements, the main reason for its purchase is that it is a 'nice ride.'
The modifying adjective "nice" refers to its useless components, while
the center component, the noun "ride," refers to the product's
function. The potential for the car to make an instrumental process
pleasurable is what relegates it to the realm of desire and excess, and
therefore makes it suitable as a product for conspicuous
consumption.
Another example is the Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) device. In many
cases, the way this diagnostic tool is used in medical institutions may
actually be abuse. The MRI is a very expensive piece of state of the
art med-tech, so it is an investment that must be used to recoup the
initial capital expenditure. The MRI can deliver on its corporate
promise, as it is the perfect medical sight machine. In a manner far
beyond any of its predecessors, the MRI can articulate the space of the
body with such clarity that there can be no place for a biological body
invader to hide. However, in many cases, the MRI is not needed. An
X-ray is often all that is required to diagnose an illness. Excess
enters this equation when the MRI is used abusively on the part of the
doctor (simply as means to increase profit or to protect capital). Much
the same can be said even when the machine is used as an extra
precaution by the doctor or the patient. In any case, the MRI, like the
luxury car, can only strive toward purity; it will never actually reach
it. The MRI will always have the practical function of vision
associated with it. Unlike these aforementioned examples, the useless
is rarely noticed, because it is not a part of limited bourgeois
excess. As consumers, we are not trained to witness uselessness or
consciously value it - its psychic roots are buried much deeper in
consciousness and in the economy.
Too often, excessive luxury in the center realm of the visible is
mistaken for the limits of excess, but the limits of excess go far
beyond the visible. To comprehend extreme excess, one must go beyond
conspicuous consumption. Excess will never be seen, only imagined, and
within this ideal space the margins can at least be understood. Whether
it is a useless chip in the bowels of a machine, the technology that
lives in people's closets, or an underground missile system, the purity
of uselessness, the limits of excess, are not visible. The real
deployment of power flows in absence, in the uncanny, nonrational
margins of existence.
Sacrifices beyond the boundary between the visible and the invisible
occasionally surface in everyday life. We all know that many people die
on the roads and highways of the US every year (approximately 50,000
per year). These people are willingly and uselessly sacrificed to show
the sincerity of our desire for transportation technology. No means to
end this sacrifice exists, short of closing the roads, and yet no honor
is paid to those who give their life for the excess of travel - it
remains forever hidden. Philosopher and artist Gregory Ulmer proposed
that an addendum be made to the Viet Nam war memorial in which the
names of those killed on the highway would be spooled off on a printer
beside the monument. Needless to say this monument was rejected, since
such sacrifice and excess must remain hidden in modern societies. To
monumentalize death and uselessness is simply too frightening.
Monuments to the sacrifices of the state are typical, but are only the
beginning. Most of these monuments are abstracted bits of concrete,
marble, bronze, or some other material that will signify the longevity
of artificially created memory. But there are times when these
monuments are brutally honest, and useless technology along with its
slaves is put on public display. The USS Arizona, for example -
a half sunken ship with the ship's full complement of corpses (officers
included) rests silently in Pearl Harbor. This national monument, a
functional item made useless through sacrifice, suggests the
metaphysical moment of profound loss through its lack of function. (Woe
to anyone who does not treat this sacred relic with proper respect, for
it speaks of the will to excess, which is grounded in human uselessness
in the face of death). But what is even more compelling about this
monument is that the ship is carried on the active duty roster. This
necropolis is more a symbol of the absent core of the war machine than
a monument to the US soldiers who died in the battle of Pearl Harbor;
it monumentalizes transcendental uselessness.
Utopian technology is that technology which has fallen from grace. It
has been stripped of its purity and reendowed with utility. The fall is
necessitated by a return to contact with humanity. Having once left the
production table, the technology that lives the godly life of state-of-
the-art uselessness has no further interaction with humans as users or
as inventors; rather, humans serve only as a means to maintain its
uselessness. The location of the most complex pure technology is of no
mystery. Deep in the core of the war machine is the missile system.
Ultimately, all research is centered around this invisible monument to
uselessness. The bigger and more powerful it becomes, the greater its
value. But should it ever be touched by utility - that is, should it
ever be used - its value becomes naught. To be of value, it must be
maintained, upgraded, and expanded, but it must never actually do
anything. This idol of destruction is forever hungry, and is willing to
eat all resources. In return, however, it excretes objects of utility.
Consumer communications and transportation systems, for example, have
dramatically improved due to the continuous research aimed at
increasing the grandeur of the apparatus of uselessness.
There can be a stopping point to this process - a discovery made by the
collapsing Soviet Union. For all the 'patriots of democracy' who gave a
collective sigh of relief and boasted that they were at last proven
right - "communism doesn't work" - there still may be a need to worry.
The fall of the USSR had little to do with ideology. The US and USSR
were competitors in producing the best apparatus of uselessness in
order to prove its own respective Hegelian mastery of the globe. Modern
autocrats and oligarchs have long known that a standing army puts an
undue strain on the economy. To be sure, standing armies were early
monuments to uselessness, but in terms of both size and cost, they are
dwarfed by the standing missile system of the electronic age. As with
all things that are useless, there will be no return on the investment
in it. The useless represents a 100% loss of capital. Although such
investment seems to go against the utilitarian grain of visible
bourgeois culture, whether in socialist or in constitutional republics,
the compulsive desire for a useless master is much greater (Japan is an
interesting exception to this rule). Unfortunately for the USSR, they
were unable to indulge in pure excess expenditure at the same rate as
the US. The soviet techno-idol was a little more constipated, and could
not maintain the needed rate of excretion. Consequently, once the
limits of uselessness were reached, that system imploded.
The US government, on the other hand, has to this day remained
convinced that further progress can be made. Reagan and his Star Wars
campaign issued a policy radically expanding the useless. Reagan, of
course, was the perfect one to make the policy, since he was an idol to
uselessness himself. He represents one of the few times that
uselessness has taken an organic form in this century. (This is part of
the reason he was considered such a bourgeois hero. He was willing to
personally plunge into uselessness without apology. He did not let a
thing stand in for him). Playing on yuppie paranoia (the fascists'
friend), Reagan convinced the public loyal to him that a defensive
monument (Star Wars) to uselessness was needed, just in case the
offensive monument (the missile system) was not enough. He was
successful enough in his plea to guarantee that years of useless
research will ensue that no one will be able to stop, even if his
original monumental vision (a net of laser armed satellites) should be
erased. In this manner, Reagan made sure that the apparatus of
uselessness would expand even if the cold war ended.
Indeed, this situation has come to pass. Currently, the US has no
competitors in the race to uselessness, but the monument continues to
be maintained and even to grow, which is particularly odd, since even
the cynical argument of deterrence is now moot. Even though the
offensive monument to uselessness seems to be shrinking - missiles are
being defused and cut apart with the care and order of high ritual, and
technology costing millions of dollars is being laid to rest, having
never done anything but exist - thanks to Reagan's farsightedness, the
general system continues to expand. Although many are still in denial,
the desire of the bourgeois to subordinate themselves to the useless
has become, for the moment, glaringly visible. The research is done;
the system is upgraded, but for what reason? The missiles are now aimed
at the ocean, so that even if they are 'used,' they will still be
useless. The fragments of Star Wars technology have not been released
in pure form from the experimental labs, and even if they were, no
enemy exists against which Star Wars technology would protect US
citizens. The American system has achieved utter transcendental
uselessness. This techno-historical moment is the highest manifestation
of technological purity.
In his rush to save the apparatus of the useless from stalling, Reagan
may have made one error. When he put the idea of the defensive monument
in the minds of Americans, he disrupted the primary sign of the war
machine - mutually assured destruction. He restored hope in American
consciousness that perhaps utility could save US citizens from the
total annihilation certain to destroy the rest of the world. The
disassociation of death and uselessness took previously sacred elements
of war-tech out of the privileged realm. When these elements became
depurified, their value in terms of the satisfaction of bourgeois
desire plummeted. This is partly why Reagan's original Star Wars vision
has been dismantled.
Thus far, however, most war-tech has not been depurified due to this
ideological slippage, and the purity of offensive weapons of mass
destruction continues to be enforced. Nations that do not understand
the code of uselessness but that have state-of-the-art military
technology are a cause for great concern. Iraq, Libya, and North Korea
are all good examples. The US government is willing to take hostile
action based merely on the belief that North Korea and Libya might get
weapons of mass destruction and actually use them. In the case of Iraq,
the code was actually broken when that government used chemical
weapons. Iraq has not done well economically or militarily since that
time. The lesson to be learned is that nations that do not subordinate
themselves to the bourgeois idols of uselessness will be sacrificed as
heretics, and will be denied access to the icons of uselessness.
In spite of the common wisdom of using the variables of national
interest and utility to explain the relationship between desire and
power, it is just as fruitful to do so using the principles of the
anti-economy-perversity and uselessness. The economy of unchanneled
desire and perversity, as suggested by Bataille, penetrates the surface
of utility in a most convincing way. Progress in the 20th century has
primarily consisted of bourgeois culture looking for a new master. In
the time of bourgeois revolution, the aristocracy was destroyed, as was
the church with its spiritual hierarchies, but the primordial desire to
serve the useless has never been affected. The 'primitive' ritual of
offering goods to an angry or potentially angry God in order to appease
it into a state of neutrality continues to replay itself in complex
capitalist economy. All things must be subordinated to neutrality - to
uselessness. One major difference between the age of the virtual and
more primitive times is that the contemporary idols have no
metaphysical referent. The ones that have been constructed are not the
mediating points between person and spirit, or life and afterlife;
rather, they are end-points, empty signs. To this paper master,
sacrifice has no limit. The stairs of the temple flow with blood every
day. How fitting for progress to come to this end in the empire of the
useless. As this mythic narrative continues to play itself out, the
suggestion of Arthur and Marilouise Kroker begins to make more and more
sense. We are not witnessing the decline of late capital, but instead,
its recline into its own delirious death trance.
The Critical Art Ensemble (CAE) is a collective
of six artists of different specializations committed to the production
of a new genre art that explores the intersections among critical
theory, art, and technology. The Revolution Will Be Televised
See also Critical Art Ensemble's Useless Technology.