. Education's semi-autonomous formal and
informal cultural spaces, which in part lived within Bourdieu's
habitus or Habermas' lifeworld, are being moved to a
hypercolonised confine termed the Information Age. Lifelong
learning, in its headlong pursuit of relevance as defined by Market,
finds itself in the vanguard of this move, perhaps unwittingly
championing an information age academic Diaspora.
The radical late twentieth century systematic, structural, semiotic
and discursive (Lowe, 1995) re-write popularly termed the Information
Age has its inhabitants scurrying about, caught within the glare of a
reductionist Market ethic - Adapt or You're Toast (Kroker &
Weinstein, 1994). With a new information age bourgeoisie ascendant,
this new 'virtual class', as Kroker and Weinstein explain, is:
projecting its class interests onto cyberspace from which
vantage point it crushes any and all dissent to the prevailing
orthodoxies of technotopia. For the virtual class, politics is
about absolute control over intellectual property by means of
strategies of communication, control and command. (And further:)
Key to the success of the virtual class is its promotion of a
radically diminished vision of human experience and of a
disintegrated conception of the human good: for virtualizers,
the good is ultimately that which disappears human subjectivity,
substituting the war-machine of cyberspace for the data trash
of experience.
This paper argues that lifelong learning is a central ideological and
pedagogical apparatus (discursive device) for the promotion of this
radically diminished vision of human experience and of a
disintegrated conception of human good. It argues that
'disappearing (delimiting) subjectivities' is the unstated goal of
lifelong learning. It posits that the womb-to-tomb state supported
projects of instrumental learning that increasingly define lifelong
learning (Boshier, 1997), far from assuaging the demons loosed by
global competition, will excite them even more, leaving its purported
goals of fostering individual empowerment and personal and social
security receding ever further into a bleak though hi-tech future.
Locating the Information Age
Befitting a saga of renovated social Darwinism, the provenance of the
age is located in the American military. The technology that spawned
the age became visible circa 1970 with the Mohammed Ali/Joe Frasier
boxing match titled the Thrilla' in Manila (not to be confused with
the Mohammed Ali/George Foreman Rumble in the Jungle in Kinshasa
staged later). This fight marked the first time the command,
communications and control system developed during the war in Vietnam
was put to large scale civilian (commercial) use to capture a
prime-time home audience with a live (real time) feed of an
entertainment event. A search for the source of the Internet, the
defining information technology (IT) of the moment, locates it in
that self-same military, because planners held that a diffuse
decentralised electronic communications system built around many
nodes (the Internet) would be difficult to destroy if the Cold War
turned hot (Dizard, 1997). The original system is being rebuilt
according to the specifications of capital, and even more
specifically to the capital of Bill Gates, who, along with forays
into cable and cellular distribution, is working with Boeing to
blanket the globe with 228 low-flying communications satellites. The
'microchip' finds itself in similar company, a product of
publicly-funded research and development, which, like satellite
communications, found itself internationally conscripted by the
'private' sector.
In itself the martial provenance and commercial reconstruction of
these enabling technologies is unremarkable, except that unlike the
Nuclear Age, Jet Age or Space Age, and like its more distant
antecedent the Steam Age, the Information Age is discursively
constructed as the issue of heroic rather that state capitalism. For
example, Steve Jobs, working in his family's garage in California,
comes up with the Apple, only to see its user interface 'modelled'
by Bill Gates. The Titans battle and Gates' Microsoft wins; along
the way Gates becomes about the richest man on earth and the popular
icon of the era. This tale of down-home competition leading to untold
power and wealth grounds a cultural imaginary that harkens back to a
less complex era of less restrained (free-booting) capitalism. With
Bill and Steve popularly constructed as 'info-neers' in much the same
mould as their forebears, Alexander Graham Bell and Thomas Edison,
viewers may concur that within a free-enterprise system genius will
rise to the top. That the genius and enterprise is far from 'free' goes
missing in this narrative of meritocratic hope and technological
redemption. The hundreds of billions of dollars of publicly funded
education, research and development that ground the age, and the
opportunity costs that accompanied them, are written-off (out), only
to be derisively reintroduced (Usher & Edwards, 1994) as deleterious
to the workings of a transcendental 'invisible hand'.
Locating the information age in rejuvenated free enterprise and
individual opportunity instead of, for example, in social
intelligence and wealth, ties it neatly to the 'ideology of
competitive individualism'. A seamless fit between the political and
economic (neo-liberalism, social Darwinism) and the economic and
technological (instrumental rationalism, functionalism, scientism)
moments grounds a hegemonic narrative of the reduction of life
possibilities for the many, those included in what G.K. Galbraith
terms the (dys)Functional Underclass. Unlike the beginnings of the
industrial age in Britain which saw the Luddites fighting negative
aspects of its imposition so well, today's Luddites seem lacking in
moral authority. Without a neo-Luddite 'General Ludd' to lead,
resistance to the information age remains muted, though thousands of
intense rear-guard actions, often lead by public sector unions,
continue to be fought. Yet the ability of Murdoch, Gates and Turner,
Fairchild, Sony, Matsui, Samsung, Disney, Phillips, Siemens,
Time/Warner (or whatever the latest polyglot mega-conglomerate may
be) to define information age production/consumption in terms of
their making, remains intact. Eliding existing classes as well as
physical and social geographies, this age, very like the industrial
one before, forms new and often repressive geographies and classes
within a hegemonic narrative of rekindled hope. Virtually overnight
the gilding on the information age seems as permanently affixed as
the gilding layered onto the age of steam a century ago.
Cold War to Old War
A political economy of irony marks the information age. With the
industrial revolution re-played as a virtual post-industrial
revolution, 'symbolic-analytic service workers' re-place the civil
and mechanical engineers that wrote the first industrial revolution
onto global land and mindscapes. The discursive constructions of
these 'image-ineers' are the information age. With the rise of this
'virtual class' corresponding with a 'race to the bottom' for so many
others (the functional underclass), constructing a reason (an
ideology) for this popular impoverishment and justifying the
privilege of the digeratti and their hosts, has kept thousands of
symbolic-analytic service workers on-the-job for years. Their work,
for one, lead to the imbrication of 'globalisation' which means,
simply, world trade, and signifies the hegemonic valuation of Market
(Jameson, 1994) with 'information' (for example see Bell, Toffler,
Gilder, Drucker, Naisbitt) to construct the contemporary information
age. As Kumar (1995: 34) states:
To call the information society an ideology, and to relate that
ideology to the contemporary needs of capitalism, is to begin,
not to end, the analysis. Capitalism has had many ideologies
over the past two hundred years - laissez-faire, managerialism,
welfarism, even, arguably, varieties of fascism and communism...
What kind of ideology is the ideology of the information
society, and what are its particular contradictions? 'The
Information Society' may be a partial and one-sided way of
expressing social reality, but for many people in the industrial
world it is an escapable part of that reality.
With intra-capitalist competition of the information age replacing
extra-capitalist competition of the Cold War era, 'global
competition' displaces 'missile gaps' and the 'race in space' as the
prime threat to individual and social security in nations in the
'west'. With that, educational strategies, though the challenge of
Sputnik is nostalgia now, remain central to national security
(Baldwin, 1996). Education joins with nation, both falling victim to
a highly sophisticated postmodern semiotic shell game that
promiscuously usurps and re-codes signifiers by deliberately changing
the signification historically associated with them. In the
post-industrial 'west' one enemy (global competition) stands-in for
another (communism). This rhetorical displacement constructs a
post-national info-age 'nationalism' that occludes 'nation' by
harkening back to and redistributing the now polysemous signifiers
that defined it originally. Words like individualism, freedom,
competition, co-operation and democracy are redeployed on the quickly
shifting terrain of post-industrial consumption/production. In the
process, the meanings attached to the signifier nation, like the
signifier education (and lifelong learning), have been inverted, used
now to institute, justify and maintain a globalised (or regionalised)
economic system deliberately designed since WWII to facilitate
extra-national capital and technological flows (Bretton Woods, GATT,
NAFTA, European Union, ASEAN, etc.) that cannot but undermine the
'nation' and 'self' hood that the signifiers purport to renew.
David Cook in his 1994 review article of the work of the three
leading liberal economists in the US (Thurow, Galbriath and Reich)
titled "Farewell to American Culture, Work and Competition" addresses
these 'post-national' social and geographic formations:
what is left (in today's global economy) are transnational
global knowledge webs (that is no longer property based
corporations per se) and large holding areas of labour
identified with nation states or trading areas. These labour
encampments contain in turn 'workers' in three classes: "routine
production services, in person services, and symbolic-analytic
services." (p. 174) Of these categories the first is completely
fungible (clonal) with any other labour source and hence is
consigned to permanent 'poverty', the second being more site
specific is marginally better off but going nowhere
(homeostasis), leaving only the third as the skilled technical
class created by the rich but whose future Reich sees in terms
of the universal, transnational economy.
To quote Cook comments regarding Riech's work further, saying that
for middle and Eastern Europeans, "Basic attitudes about fairness
will have to change" (p. 97) acknowledging the projected growth in
inequalities and the unstated creation of an underclass governed by
technological demands.
In Canada, 'clonal' workers who in large comprise this fast emerging
underclass are provided lifelong learning 'opportunities' through
sometimes compulsory short term on-the-job training, frequently in
'fast-food' outlets, often combined with equally short term
institutionally based training. Second level 'on-site' (i.e.,
relatively immobile) workers are offered technical and business
training, retraining and upgrading. These 'opportunities' are
usually funded by the workers themselves through the federally
administered 'employment insurance' program. An array of Continuing
Education courses and programs are offered to this group by distance
(now called distributed learning) or on-site in schools, colleges and
universities in every corner of the country. The cost of this 'CE'
is most often borne by the individual directly rather than through an
employer or government. Finally, postgraduate university programs,
short term learning experiences such as those offered at the Banff
School, and management training courses sponsored by experts like
Peter Senge, exemplify lifelong learning for the third class.
Colonizing management studies that incorporate techniques such as
Total Quality Management (TQM), though beyond the purvey of this
paper, are lifelong learning exercises absolutely central to the
dissemination of the ideology of the information age. The
(tautological) interior logic of this managerial discourse (for
example see Senge, The Fifth Discipline, 1995) grounds a
recolonisation of labour, a 'de' and 're' skilling that emphasises
attitudinal (affective attributes) rather than technical or knowledge
based 'competence' (see for example British Columbia's Employability
Skills website at http://www.est.gov.bc.ca/btp/welcome.htm). Again
strategies of rhetorical redeployment of terms like worker
empowerment, which have been stripped of their previous meaning,
legitimises the realties of the info-age workplace (exile in
cyberspace?). This new managerial ideology provides the foundation
for the 'learning organisation' and the 'learning society', which is
the inverse of the utopian model for lifelong education envisioned,
for one , by Faure in 1972 (see below). Lifelong learning, it seems,
is somewhat dismissive of class, sentencing all but the wealthy to
it.
Lifelong Learning: A Recuperative Moment in the Information Age
In Lifelong Education: A Psychological Analysis, A. J. Cropley
(1977: 20) writes:
The conceptualization of education as a tool for developing
individuals who will learn throughout life and thus become more
valuable to society is to be found in the writings of both
Matthew Arnold (see for example Johnson, 1972), and Comenius
(see Kyrasek & Polisensky, 1968), as well as educational writers
in antiquity. Dewey (1916, pp. 90-91) expressed the view that
education and learning are lifelong processes over 60 years ago.
A report to the British Government at the end of the first world
war (Ministry of reconstruction of Adult education Committee,
1919) specifically recommended that education should be
"lifelong", as a matter of national importance. However, it is
apparent that in the 60 years or so since Dewey's
recommendations for the U.S. and the Ministry of Reconstruction's
recommendations for the U.K., truly lifelong-oriented educational
systems have not been developed.
Since 1977 truly lifelong-oriented educational systems - as a tool
for developing individuals who will learn throughout life and thus
become more valuable to society have been developed in the nations of
the 'west', though these systems invert the utopic systems envisioned
in the 1960's. Lifelong learning today is largely a project of
economic, social and epistemological recuperation dedicated to
delimiting rather than expanding the subjectivities of learners
exposed to it (see below). Boshier (1997) addresses this changed
trajectory in lifelong learning:
Many educators thought the 1970's and 1980's would be a linear
extension of the 1960's and reform along the anticipated lines would
not be a problem. But after the OPEC oil crisis of 1973 the mood
changed and the utopian vision anticipated by Faure (Learning to Be,
the UNESCO report of 1972 authored by Faure) was significantly cooled
by new right discourses. But despite these developments there were
significant theoretical elaborations of lifelong education in the
1970's (Kallen, 1979), important reforms were made and in several
UNESCO member states, some of Faure's ideas were implemented. But
now, 25 years after Faure, educators are struggling with cutbacks and
restructuring and some of the liberatory developments anticipated by
Faure (such as distance education) have been hijacked by architects
of the new right.
Today's lifelong learning differs in appearance and kind from recent
constructions of adult, or indeed childhood education. Much of it is
predicated upon breaking down the binary between adult/child and
valorising learning in both formal and informal environments that
stretch from the cradle to the grave. As Clinton's home-school-work
'educational initiatives' demonstrate, learners are indeed being
sentenced to life. While there is undoubtedly a liberating moment
attached to the removal of such binaries and to extravagant
extensions of education, especially the learning experiences
dedicated to the 'new middle class' (Usher and Edwards, p. 190-191),
which provides a description of service-analytic workers in repose,
nonetheless lifelong learning designed for the many remains a
discourse of instrumentalism concerned with constructing subjectivity
(human capital) according to the specifications of the current
"information age" regime of virtual production/consumption.
This competency-based discourse redesigned for the Information Age
came late to British Columbia. Like its imperial precursors in the
UK and the US, it is being implemented by attaching 'advisory
committees' to ensure the programs are relevant to info-age 'industry
needs', by state funded curricular initiatives, for example the
compulsory Career and Personal Planning curriculum for grade school
students that teaches the 'value' of 'lifelong learning', by private
sector curricular initiatives like the Conference Board of Canada's
(the country' largest 'think tank') Employability Skills Profile
which emphasises the market value of lifelong learning, and by
Ministry funded initiatives to de-emphasise 'content-based' academic
education and emphasise competency-based education aimed at the
development of 'process' skills'. The new strategic plan for the
province's colleges and institutes warns that if institutions do not
take on these voluntarily the government will do it for them
(Charting A New Course, 1996: 28-29), though the also report states
the Ministry, however, favours an approach of revitalized
partnerships. B.C. will work to create a revitalized public system
that can act as a "hub" for new approaches to lifelong learning.
A document produced by the state-funded Centre for Curriculum and
Professional Development in British Columbia captures the trajectory
of this contemporary project in which lifelong learning is a
component of a larger discourse of competency-based education
dedicated to Market:
Strategically presented and tactically supported over time,
these actions (prior learning assessment) can help create the
"seamless learning system " BC (British Columbia) needs: one
that will value, recognize and credit the skills, knowledge and
abilities of British Columbian citizens, regardless of how, when
or where they were achieved and provide flexible learning
options adults require as part of their growing commitment to
lifelong learning (Centre for Curriculum and Professional
Development, 1995: 39)
An adaptable workforce that is constantly being re(under)developed to
compensate for the skills, knowledge and attitudinal obsolescence
built-into the information age, provides the specifications to which
British Columbia's colleges and institutes are being retrofitted.
This economic "downloading" onto the worker/learner, as so many
stories about the "new" poor attest, cannot but have deleterious
effects, especially for those relegated to 'clonal' status. By
consciously designing learning for everyone to limit the production
of consciousness not dedicated to Market, and by limiting the
production of 'officially sanctioned' surplus consciousness once
again to the few (elite universities), lifelong learning, in
aspects, relegates mass education to the disciplinary role that was
used to justify its implementation during the steam age.
Lifelong learning, in an inverse of its original intent to make
learning more attractive by removing associations with 'schooling'
(Boshier, 1997), has made 'education' more intrusive. 'Dropping out'
at age 15 or 50 has become much more difficult, for 'drop-outs' don't
just leave school; they leave already reduced life possibilities.
The learners that do continue their 'schooling', and various
compulsory educational schemes for adults see to it that more and
more do, engage a highly-scripted scenario that increasingly finds
them sentenced to an unending search for the Holy Grail of
'value-added' learning, a grail that is proving more ephemeral in
this era of post-Fordist labour displacement and out-sourcing than
the one pursued by Galahad some time ago. Lifelong learning 'for
tomorrow', in practice, has become mandatory if one is to participate
in the redundant and highly-stylised performance piece referred to as
labour today.
Learning 'to be' on demand and just-in-time
To most accounts the information age has arrived, and its varied and
disputed effects are being academically mapped and analysed. Mark
Poster, addressing postmodern society specifically, states:
Telephone, radio, film, television, the computer and now
integration as 'multimedia' reconfigure words, sounds and
images so as to cultivate new configurations of individuality.
If modern society may be said to foster an individual who is
rational, autonomous, centered, and stable (the "reasonable man"
of the law, the educated citizen of representative democracy,
the calculating "economic man " of capitalism, the grade-defined
student of public education), then perhaps a postmodern society
is emerging which nurtures forms of identity different from,
even opposite to, those of modernity (Poster, 1995:24)
Forms of identity, it appears, can develop variously and do not
necessarily hypostatise as 'modern' subjectivity supposedly did.
When this technologically determined subjective fluidity is combined
with the (post)philosophic challenges (poststructuralism, etc.) to a
unitary subjectivity from within an academy that was until the mid
60's unilaterally humanist, the changed social, economic and
technological conditions termed the information age (the rise of the
underclass, the digeratti, globalisation, mediated communication)
speak of a new space within which 'subjectivity' is itself being
rewritten.
As Donald Lowe (1995: 88) explains:
...we have in late capitalism the valorization of social
reproduction, gender, and sexuality, and even psychic make-up.
In other words, the regime of accumulation in late capitalism
can no longer rely on a relatively stable, relatively autonomous
mode of regulation, but needs to underdevelop and thus
destabilize it.
Education has been a bulwark of the relatively autonomous, relatively
stable mode of regulation (social reproduction) that Poster equated
with modernity. Underdeveloping it is precisely what the social
reproduction activity termed lifelong learning does. Like
advertising, lifelong learning roots out stable competency and
constant identity, for which it substitutes lack and desire
(underdevelopment). This harmonises 'education' with the current
regime of production/consumption, for example, the micro-credential
required each time a new software program is purchased. Recurrent
(re)learning is a necessity if the education system is to continue to
produce the malleable but disciplined consumer/producer/citizen
that the information age is built upon.
The power that has recently accrued to lifelong learning is massive
and suggests possibilities not included within current parameters of
design. As the private-sector initiatives outlined above
demonstrate, in British Columbia, Market is, in effect, reaping the
rewards of a system designed to its specifications without incurring
the costs. When lifelong learning is viewed as a deliberate and
refined process designed to construct subjectivity in accord with
info-age specifications, as a vehicle for selling commodities, and
as a profitable commodity itself, it occludes many pedagogical
possibilities. Examining all the 'opportunity costs' attached to its
implementation might cause celebrationists pause, dampening some of
their enthusiasms, at least in terms of the long run.
References
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Barnett, R. The Limits to Competence: Knowledge, Higher
Education and Society. Buckingham, Society for Research into
Higher Education & Open University Press, 1994.
Boshier, R. How Lifelong Learning Was Mugged On The Road To
The 21ST Century, paper presented to the Conference of the
Comparative and International Education Society, Mexico City, 1997.
British Columbia, Ministry of Education. Skills and Training.
Charting A New Course: A Strategic Plan For The Future of British
Columbia's College, Institute and Agency System, 1996.
Centre for Curriculum and Professional Development & British Columbia
Council on Admission and Transfer. Prior Learning Assessment
and Educational Reform. 1995.
Cropley, A. Lifelong Education A Psychological Analysis.
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Dizard, W. (Jr.). Old Media, New Media: Mass Communications
In The Information Age. New York: Longman, 1997.
Jameson, F. Postmodernism and the Market, in Sisek, S. (ed.)
Mapping Ideology. London: Verso, 1994.
Kroker A. & M. Weinstein. Data trash: The Theory of the
Virtual Class. Montreal: New World Perspectives, 1994.
Kumar, K. From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society: New
Theories of the Contemporary World. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.
Lowe, D. The Body In Late-Capitalist Society. Durham: Duke
University Press, 1995.
Lyotard, J.F. The Postmodern Condition. Minneapolis: The
University of Minnesota Press, 1984.
Poster, M. The Second Media Age. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996.
Usher, R. and Edwards, R. Postmodernism and Education.
London: Routledge, 1994.
Cliff Falk is a doctoral student in curriculum studies at Simon
Fraser University. His current work concerns the (re)constitution
and (re)institution of learning and knowledge.